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As in much of the tropics, the people living in the
Ranomafana rainforest of Southeastern Madagascar are the for-
est's worst enemy, slashing and burning huge swaths of trees to
clear land for crops ...
... At the turn of the century, at least a quarter of Madagas-
car was forested; now half that is gone, most of the countryside
exposed to the baking sun and gouging rain.'
I. INTRODUCTION
One hundred sixty-five million years ago, the world's fourth larg-
est island, Madagascar, was separated from eastern Africa.2 The
island became a "living laboratory" for the evolution of species of
1. Knox, No Man an Island, SIERRA, May-June 1989, at 81.
2. Jolly, Madagascar: A World Apart, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Feb. 1987, at 149, 160.
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plants and animals that existed nowhere else.' As a result, Madagas-
car, a country slightly smaller than the State of Texas, contains twelve
thousand plant species, over sixty percent of which are endemic.
Only twelve of its four hundred species of amphibians and reptiles
exist elsewhere.5 Yet, the present flora represents just a small portion
of the flora that existed on the island before almost four-fifths of the
forest cover was destroyed.6 The forest along the eastern ridges of the
island once may have covered at least sixty-two thousand square kilo-
meters and now, because of farming pressures, it has been reduced to
about twenty-four thousand square kilometers.7 By the end of this
decade, if the pressures are not relieved, little of Madagascar's pri-
mary forest will remain intact." Dozens of endemic plants are now
becoming extinct and hundreds or perhaps thousands of other plants
will be reduced to just a few sparse populations. 9
Madagascar's forests and their inhabitants are no match for the
force of Madagascar's economic pressures. With a per capita income
of less than three hundred dollars,' 0 an average annual inflation rate
of more than twenty percent,'" an external debt of more than three
billion dollars, 2 and a population that depends on agriculture for its
income, 13 there are insurmountable pressures on the government and
the population to resort to the forest for income. Four-fifths of Mada-
gascar stands barren, burned by subsistence farmers and cattle herd-
ers. 14 Peasants slash and burn trees to plant rice and corn in land that
will soon be infertile.'5 The government encourages peasants to burn
the forest to clear it for their crops.' 6
To counteract the destructive effects of the economy and poor
agricultural management on the forests of Madagascar and other
threatened forests in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, environmental
3. Id. at 149.
4. Id. at 160.
5. Id.
6. N. MYERS, THE PRIMARY SOURCE 54-55 (1984).
7. Id. at 55.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, A DEBT-FOR-NATURE PROGRAM FOR MADAGASCAR: A
PROPOSAL SUBMITTED TO: UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
BUREAU FOR AFRICA 4 (1989) [hereinafter WWF PROPOSAL TO USAID].
11. EUROPA PUBLICATIONS LTD., EUROPA WORLD Y.B. 1990, at 1659 (1990).
12. Id.
13. AMERICAN EMBASSY ANTANANARIVO, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN
ECONOMIC TRENDS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 3, 4 (1987).
14. Id. at 162.
15. Id. at 163.
16. Id. at 176.
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organizations have pioneered debt-for-nature swaps. 17 Such swaps
involve "an exchange or cancellation of a foreign country's debt in
return for the debtor country's commitment to use a given amount of
local currency funds to protect national parks, establish environmen-
tal education programs or train people in natural resource conserva-
tion or management."' 8  In a debt-for-nature swap, a non-
governmental organization ("NGO")' 9 seeks out threatened environ-
mental resources and proposes a swap transaction to the government
and central bank of a debtor country ("debtor country" or "host
country") that has the environmental resources.2 ° Once the debtor
country government and central bank approve the proposal, the NGO
purchases foreign-currency denominated debt of the debtor country in
the international debt market at a substantial discount. 21 The NGO
presents the debt to the central bank of the debtor country for
redemption in local currency.22 The debt is officially retired and the
NGO uses the local currency proceeds to fund environmental projects
in the debtor country.23
Debt-for-nature swaps are analogous to debt-for-equity swaps.
In a debt-for-equity swap, "an investor buys a portion of a debtor
country's debt and exchanges the debt for an equity interest in a local
firm or another local asset, instead of collecting the hard currency
originally borrowed. ' 24 Unlike debt-for-equity swaps, the purchaser
of the debt in a debt-for-nature swap (the NGO) does not take title to
an asset in the debtor country. Rather, the NGO obtains a commit-
ment from the debtor-country government to protect an endangered
habitat 25 or to train people in natural resource conservation and sus-
tainable development. 26 In addition, debt-for-equity swaps are of a
17. Debt-for-nature swaps involve the acquisition of debt by a conservation organization
and its redemption in local currency to be used for conservation purposes. See Cody, Debt for
Nature Swaps in Developing Countries.- An Overview of Recent Conservation Efforts, 88-647
ENR Cong. Res. Serv. 1 (Sept. 26, 1989). Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Zambia, Madagascar,
and the Philippines each concluded debt-for-nature swaps between December, 1987, and
April, 1989. Comment, Debt-for-Nature Swaps.- Assessing the Future, 6 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POL'Y 319, 326-34 (1990).
18. Cody, supra note 17, at I.
19. Among the NGO's that have completed debt-for-nature swaps are Conservation







25. Intrados Group, Debt for Nature: The Second Year, 2 SWAPS: NEWSL. NEW FIN.
INSTRUMENTS, Nov. 1988, at 1, 4.
26. WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T & DEV., FROM ONE EARTH TO ONE WORLD 43 (1987).
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pecuniary nature: the investor puts hard currency into an investment
from which she expects a return. The pecuniary nature of equity
investments makes compensation an appropriate remedy in the event
of expropriation by a host country. On the other hand, debt-for-
nature swaps are non-pecuniary: the NGO invests in the host coun-
try's environment, with no expectation of financial return. This
makes compensation an inadequate remedy in the event of host coun-
try expropriation.
If a host country interferes with the 'environmental investor's
rights to "protect and administer" 27 the swap territory, customary
international law provides that this interference constitutes expropria-
tion, although the swap investor does not possess title to the swap
property.28 Furthermore, assuming the agreement between the envi-
ronmental investor, the NGO, and the host country government is
contractual, if the host country prohibits performance of the contract,
an expropriation also occurs, because contract rights are considered
to be property under international law.29
Not all developing countries are good candidates for debt-for-
nature swaps. The ideal circumstances for a debt-for-nature swap
involve a debtor country with a low debt rating, so creditor banks are
willing to discount the debt,a0 and with debt that is not easily convert-
ible, so the creditor bank does not have as many opportunities to sell
"Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." Id. In practical
terms, sustainable development requires a government to make effective use of renewable
resources so that "exploitation rates stay within the limits of sustainable yields and so that
finances are available to regenerate resources and deal with all linked environmental effects."
Id. at 82. As for non-renewable resources such as minerals, governments must ensure that: 1)
leaseholders engaged in exploration add to proven reserves at least the amount of the substance
extracted; 2) the ratio of production to proven reserves remains below a pre-approved limit; 3)
funds generated by royalties are used in a way that compensates for the nation's declining
income when the resource deposit is exhausted; and 4) the leaseholder is responsible for land
restoration and other environmental control measures in the mined area. Id. at 82-83.
27. See WWF Proposal to USAID supra note 10, at 9-16.
28. Verwey & Schrijver, The Taking of Foreign Property Under International Law: A New
Legal Perspective?, 1984 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 5.
29. See Christie, What Constitutes a Taking of Property Under International Law, 1962
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 307, 309, 316-18 & 321. Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia
(Ger. v. Pol.), 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7, at I (May 25), and Norwegian Claims Case (Nor. v.
U.S.), Hague Ct. Rep. 2d (Scott) 39 (1922). The international forum held that states
expropriated contract rights by seizing the contract's related physical assets. The
expropriation made the contract rights essentially useless without the physical assets
themselves. Christie, supra, at 311, 316. Other cases have involved such a subtle interference
with contract rights that there was no clear seizure of property. Id. at 316. Where the state
"irremediably interfere[d]" with contract rights, however, there was an expropriation that
required compensation. Id. at 317.
30. Comment, supra note 17, at 323, 336.
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the debt on the secondary market to other for-profit financial
institutions."'
The swap's success may turn on whether the debtor country has
sufficient motivation to pursue environmental goals.3 2 The pressures
to use the land in a more short-term, economically advantageous and
environmentally destructive way are severe. Although developing
countries that permit swaps are concerned about protecting their for-
ests, they often lack the funds for such protection. Debt-for-nature
swaps provide developing countries with a way to protect their eco-
systems and to reduce their debt burdens.33 Even so, developing
countries must choose debt-for-nature swaps from among many com-
peting interests, including using those environmental resources to
respond to poverty, rapid population growth, and inflation. These
economic difficulties work against the long-term success of the swap
and increase the possibility of host country expropriation. 4 Without
strong motivation to comply with a debt-for-nature swap agreement, a
debtor country may surrender to economic and political pressure to
allow destruction of the protected area in furtherance of short-term
economic goals. As one commentator has observed, "Conservation
always takes a back seat in times of economic distress.
' '3
Unfortunately, NGO's fail to account adequately for economic
and developmental pressures when drafting debt-for-nature swap
agreements. 36 The agreements do not address the possibility of expro-
31. The international secondary debt market "developed originally so that banks could
swap loans among themselves thereby avoiding overexposure to any singled troubled
economy." B. Bramble, How Debt Can Be Swapped for Trees 2 (May 1988) (unpublished
report prepared by and available from National Wildlife Federation, Washington, D.C.).
32. Mushkat, International Environmental Law in the Asia-Pacific Region: Recent
Developments, 20 CAL. W. INT'L L. REV. 21, 38 (1989).
33. Debt-for-Nature Swaps: A New Means of Funding Conservation in Developing Nations,
11 Env't Rep. (BNA) 301 (May 11, 1988).
34. Leonard & Morell, Emergence of Environmental Concern in Developing Countries: A
Political Perspective, 17 STAN. J. INT'L L. 281, 306-07 (1981). Madagascar's protected areas
are "threatened by rapid deforestation due to slash-and-burn cultivation, illegal logging,
poaching, drainage of wetlands, or overgrazing by cattle and goats." Comment, supra note 17,
at 334. The motivation for these activities is economic survival. The destructive effects of
domestic pressures on environmental protection is also evident in the lack of success countries
have had in implementing environmental protection laws. Mushkat, supra note 32, at 38
(discussing Asia); see also WORLD COMM. ON ENV. & DEV., supra note 9, at 68-70, 73-75;
World Wildlife Fund, Madagascar Fact Sheet 2 (Aug. 1989) (unpublished report prepared by
and available from World Wildlife Fund, Washington, D.C.). For a thorough description of
the domestic pressures that confronted the Bolivian debt-for-nature swap with Conservation
International, see Page, Debt-for-Nature Swaps: Experience Gained, Lessons Learned, 1 INT'L
ENV. AFF. 275, 277-80 (1989); and Comment, supra note 17, at 319.
35. WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T & DEV., supra note 26, at 70.
36. The typical debt-for-nature swap is a five-step process. First, the investing NGO must
seek approval from the debtor country; second, the NGO must acquire the debt instrument;
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priation, a significant omission because debt-for-nature swaps are
investments in the environment with expectations for environmental,
not pecuniary, returns. The failure to address expropriation risk
becomes even more compelling when one realizes that the United
States government is presently committing taxpayer funds to NGO's
to fund the debt-for-nature swaps.3 7 Thus, NGO's that once were
merely risking their own funds are now risking taxpayer funds with-
out properly evaluating either the possibility of host country expropri-
ation or the available remedies in the event of such expropriation. In
contrast, a debt-for-equity investor or any foreign investor that uses
private funds always analyzes critically the risk of expropriation when
structuring an investment's form.38 Debt-for-nature swap "investors"
third, it must transfer title to the debt; and fourth, the debt must be converted into a local
currency instrument. Comment, supra note 17, at 334. The final step implements the NGO's
environmental investment, the conservation program.
[T]he creditor country or sponsoring ECO [NGO] may have the most at stake,
since it is required to not only relinquish effective control of the funds, thereby
placing them at risk, but must also assure donors and tax authorities that these
funds will be used properly and in accordance with the agreement.
Id. at 323. At present, debt-for-nature swap agreements do not include enforcement mecha-
nisms. Telephone interview with Kurt Low, Program Assistant, Conservation Finance
Department (Jan. 30, 1990) [hereinafter Telephone Interview]. This is true even though one
U.S. NGO has written that such transactions are "probably neither less nor more inherently
vulnerable to political risks than any other conservation investment in a foreign country,
unless the exchange requires a long-term financial commitment [on the part] of the host gov-
ernment." CONSERVATION INT'L, THE DEBT-FOR-NATURE EXCHANGE: A TOOL FOR
INTERNATIONAL CONSERVATION 29 (1989).
37. See infra notes 41-42.
38. See Shubin & Gibby, The Promotion of Debt-Equity Swaps in Latin America: A Survey
of the Regulatory Regimes and the International Policy Framework, 20 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REV. 69, 75, 88-91 (1988). In typical investments in foreign states, the host state
compensates the investor for assuming the risk of default by providing him with specified
privileges and guarantees over a period of time. Clagett, Protection of Foreign Investment
Under the Revised Restatement, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 73, 94 (1984). Such privileges may include
the promise of investment over a period long enough that if the project proves successful, the
privileges assure the investor of profits sufficient to recompense him for the associated risk. Id.
at 94. See generally Stansbury, Planning Against Expropriation, 24 INT'L L. 677 (1990).
An associate with the World Resources Institute compares the negotiations for debt-for-
nature swaps to the broad category of foreign aid, rather than just confining it to debt-for-
equity swaps. Page, supra note 34, at 276. The associate argues that both non-profit
organizations and foreign assistance agencies demand assurances that host countries will abide
by their programs. Id. For both swaps and foreign aid, "[a] country's designated program
managers make commitments under terms established by the government's monetary
authorities." Id. Though the negotiations may be the same, the assurances that secure the
foreign aid programs are insufficient for debt-for-nature swaps because of the swaps' distinctive
goals. For example, if the United States, through the United States Agency for International
Development ("USAID"), donates foreign aid to Madagascar to train forest rangers, USAID
meets its goal once the rangers complete their training program, even if some trained rangers
decide not to use their new skills. However, investments in environmental preservation
through debt-for-nature swaps are more vulnerable to the whims of the host government. If
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who use public funds must similarly analyze the risks of their
"investments."
The use of taxpayer funds in debt-for-nature swaps should com-
pel more risk analysis and higher scrutiny. As history reflects, expro-
priation is more than a trivial risk for long-term foreign investment.39
It is entirely foreseeable that a host country in a debt-for-nature swap
will decide after the swap has transpired and the environmental
projects are underway that it needs to use the swap territory in a man-
ner inconsistent with the swap's goals of conservation or sustainable
development.' Then the NGO, as debt purchaser in the debt-for-
nature swap, will need relief from such expropriation that is consis-
tent with the swap's objectives so it can continue to effectuate the
swap's goals. The NGO's remedies lie in the domestic law of the host
country, its own domestic law, or international law, none of which
offers appropriate relief. This Comment demonstrates that these
existing remedies are inadequate because they fail to protect the
NGO's investment. Section II defines and describes "funnel swaps,"
which involve the investment of taxpayer funds, in the name of an
NGO, and which cause problems of accountability and enforcement
due to their basic structure. This Comment uses a debt-for-nature
swap in the Democratic Republic of Madagascar as a case study
because it is the first swap to be financed primarily4 with United
the host government decides to expropriate the NGO's rights to protect the targeted swap
land, then it unilaterally subverts the program's goals.
39. Hannon & Haugen, Latin American Debt Conversion Proliferates, Bus. AM., June 22,
1987, at 2, 6; Shubin & Gibby, supra note 38, at 70.
40. One commentator insists that swap agreements are secure because they "are the
product of mutual negotiations, the 'swap' concerns control of local currency not land, and the
funds remain wholly in the [developing country] for use by local [NGO's] for the conservation
and sustainable development of 'national' natural resources, such as parks, forests or
wetlands." Comment, supra note 17, at 335. Therefore, there is a "large measure of security,
trust and accountability, given the [developing country's] vested interest in the implementation
of the agreement." Id.
41. Although USAID participated in the Bolivian and the Philippine swaps, its role was
minor. In the Bolivian swap, USAID merely donated $150,000 in pesos from its local
currency funds, which was only a fraction of the total swap investment. World Wildlife Fund,
The Bolivian Case (n.d.) (unpublished brochure printed by the World Wildlife Fund,
Washington, D.C. 20037). For the Philippine swap, USAID granted the World Wildlife
Fund ("WWF") $45,000, again, also a fraction of the total investment. World Wildlife Fund,
The Philippines Case (n.d.) (unpublished brochure printed by the World Wildlife Fund,
Washington, D.C. 20037); Debt-for-Nature Bill Moving to Senate Floor, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR, June 19, 1989, at 4. In the Malagasy swap, USAID granted $1,000,000 while the
WWF-U.S. promised "at least" $250,000 for a total investment of $1,250,000. WWF
PROPOSAL TO USAID, supra note 10, at 22; Letter from Jean Hacken, USAID Grant Officer,
Overseas Division-Africa, to Kathryn Fuller, President, World Wildlife Fund, attachment I
(Sept. 20, 1989) [hereinafter Letter] (accepting the proposal and authorizing grant No. AFR-
01 12-G-55-9095-00). This is USAID's largest investment and its first majority share in a debt-
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States taxpayer funds.42 Section III demonstrates that if the host gov-
ernment expropriates the swap territory, the NGO's only "realistic"
remedy is compensation. In truth, however, compensation is insuffi-
cient because the purpose of debt-for-nature swaps is environmental
conservation and management. Compensation, even if available to
the NGO, does not address this purpose; it simply allows the host
country to resume destruction of protected resources. Further, if
NGO's, the named parties to the swap agreement, have no effective
remedy, the United States agency that has pledged taxpayer funds has
even less protection; under the funnel swap, the United States is not a
party to the agreement and thus has no standing. Section IV suggests
that because debt-for-nature swaps involve international participants
with important objectives, namely, the trade flows between developing
and developed nations and the preservation of the world's unique spe-
cies,43 a real need exists for a treaty that provides more effective reme-
dies. This Section discusses several treaties or agreements that could
be used as models. Finally, Section V concludes that because the
promise of reciprocal benefit provides the parties to a swap agreement
with a long-term incentive to abide by its terms, NGO's and other
debt-for-nature investors should explore mandated negotiation and
conciliation options as dispute resolution mechanisms in treaties. Itis
only when innovative international environmental agreements work
that we can begin to safeguard global resources for future generations.
II. THE NEW TREND IN DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS: TAXPAYER
FUNDING
What is new is the possible addition of vast quantities of Govern-
ment money to the pot-and the prospect of a systematic, well-
financed defense of tropical forests that serve as a natural sink for
greenhouse gases and shelter the lion's share of the world's plant
and animal species.'
The magnitude of the problems host-country expropriation will
cause for debt-for-nature investors is best understood through an
example involving the latest trend in debt-for-nature swaps-tax-
payer-financed funnel swaps. Because the investor uses taxpayer
for-nature swap. United States Agency for Int'l Dev. News Release No. 41 (Aug. 3, 1989)
[hereinafter USAID News Release].
42. President Bush recently announced plans to fund debt-for-nature swaps using taxpayer
funds on a large-scale to reduce bilateral debt between Latin America and the United States.
President's address on the Enterprise for Americas (June 27, 1990) (may be requested from the
Office of the White House Press Secretary) [hereinafter President's Address].
43. Intrados Group, supra note 25, at 1.
44. N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1991, at B5, col. 4.
1202
DEBT-FOR-NA TURE SWAPS
funds to effectuate a debt-for nature swap, the investor should place a
higher priority issue on non-compliance remedies than it might for
privately funded swaps. At the very least, politics force the govern-
ment, if not the NGO, to account to the public for the manner in
which it invests taxpayer funds. This Section discusses funnel swaps
using the example of the Malagasy funnel swap, and explains the sig-
nificance of expropriation in the taxpayer-funded funnel swap.
A. Description of Funnel Swaps
The change from private NGO to taxpayer financing of debt-for-
nature swaps accentuates the need for a treaty to address expropria-
tion remedies. Although the recent debt-for-nature swaps executed in
Costa Rica,45 Zambia,46 and Ecuador" involved private investor
NGO funds, the new trend, illustrated by the debt-for-nature swaps in
Madagascar,4 Bolivia,49 and the Philippines, s° is to fund debt-for-
nature swaps at least partially with taxpayer money. A United States
governmental agency grants the funds to the NGO and then uses the
NGO as a funnel." Under the current funnel-swap plan the govern-
mental agency, generally the United States Agency for International
Development ("USAID"),52 has no direct agreement with the foreign
host government. USAID simply funnels the taxpayer funds to the
foreign host government through the NGO, which makes its own
45. The debt-for-nature swap conducted in Costa Rica in 1987 used private funds.
CONSERVATION INT'L, supra note 36, at 15; see also INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, supra note
41, at 4.
46. Comment, supra note 17, at 334.
47. Id. at 327; see also Debt-for-Nature Ad Hoc Working Group, A Brief Summary of
Debt-for-Nature Swaps (unpublished summary available from the Nature Conservancy,
Arlington, Va.) (describing the Ecuadorian swap); CONSERVATION INT'L, supra note 36, at 15
(monograph describing the history and future of debt-for-nature swaps).
48. Letter, supra note 41, attachment I.
49. The Bolivian Case, supra note 41.
50. CONSERVATION INT'L, supra note 36, at 1 (providing the amount of private funds
committed to the swap); INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, supra note 41, at 4 (providing the amount
of public funds committed to the Philippine swap).
51. UNITED STATES -AGENCY FOR INT'L DEVELOPMENT, USAID DEBT FOR
DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE 2-4 (Aug. 3, 1989) [hereinafter USAID DEBT FOR
DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE].
52. USAID implements economic assistance programs to help developing countries
"develop their human and economic resources, increase their productive capacities, and
improve the quality of human life as well as promote economic and political stability in
friendly countries." OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
MANUAL 731 (1990-1991).
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agreement with the foreign host government.53 The Malagasy54 debt-
for-nature swap is a model of such a funnel swap.
B. The Malagasy Example
World Wildlife Fund-United States ("WWF-U.S."),"1 an Ameri-
can NGO, the government of Madagascar, 6 and USAID coordinated
a funnel swap in August 1989.17 WWF-U.S. chose Madagascar
because of the endangered state of its unique tropical forest habitats,58
53. When a United States governmental agency grants funds to an NGO, the NGO must
return the funds if it does not use them according to the grant's specifications. 22 U.S.C.
§ 2399b (1988). However, in the funnel-swap situation where an NGO, and not the United
States government, independently makes an agreement with the foreign government, the
United States government lacks direct control over the funds. Although the United States
government may bring an action against the NGO for return of the funds, if the NGO used the
funds appropriately, and the foreign government recipient did not, the United States
government's link to the recipient is impaired by the lack of privity between the United States
and the recipient government.
54. "The Malagasy" is the collective noun for the people of the Democratic Republic of
Madagascar. Malagasy is an adjective describing attributes of Madagascar, such as Malagasy
forests or the Malagasy Government.
55. The parties compeleted the Malagasy debt-for-nature swap in August 1989. See WWF
PROPOSAL TO USAID, supra note 10, app. A; see also Letter, supra note 41 (describing
financial arrangements for the swap and giving USAID authorization for the swap); World
Wildlife Fund, News Release (Aug. 3, 1989) [hereinafter WWF News Release] (announcing
and detailing the Malagasy debt-for-nature swap).
56. The World Wildlife Fund-U.S. describes itself as "the leading U.S. organization
working to save endangered wildlife and habitats around the world and to protect the
biological resources on which human well-being depends." WORLD WILDLIFE FUND,
LETTER No. 1, at 2 (1988). There are World Wildlife Fund organizations in twenty-three
countries. Id.
57. WWF News Release, supra note 5.
58. "[P]revailing socio-economic conditions ... have promoted inappropriate, wasteful or
inefficient land use patterns" such as slash and burn agriculture, commercial agriculture in
fragile or forested lands, uncontrolled ranging of livestock, and timber exploitation. Id. at 4.
These methods effectively deplete non-renewable resources. Id. at 5. Poverty, and the
government's promotion of economic development through investments in commercial
agriculture and natural resource exploitation, place obvious pressures on the ecosystem.
WWF PROPOSAL TO USAID, supra note 10, at 4. If left unchecked, these forces will increase
with Madagascar's population, which is growing at three percent annually, placing an extreme
burden on the eighty-eight percent of its population that depends on the agricultural sector for
employment. AMERICAN EMBASSY ANTANANARIVO, supra note 13, at 3, 4; see also WWF
PROPOSAL TO USAID, supra note 10, at 4-5 (describing socio-economic pressures causing
inefficient land use patterns); Voss, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 686, 699 (1982) (describing the
intense need for developing countries to use their natural resources to break out of poverty).
Despite these pressures, the current Malagasy government has recognized that without the
tropical forests, Madagascar's chances of economic recovery are slim. Jolly, supra note 2, at
177, 179, 181. Joseph Randrianasolo, the Minister of Livestock, Fisheries, and Forests,
exclaimed, "If there is no more forest, then no more water, and no more rice!" Id. at 181.
Madagascar's decision to host the 1985 International Conference on Conservation and
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which contain 150,000 species unique to Madagascar.59 USAID
granted one million dollars to "increase the financial and technical
resources available in Madagascar for the protection of natural
resources and to reduce Madagascar's external debt service bur-
den."60 World Wildlife Fund-International ("WWF-Int'l") of Gland,
Switzerland, a Swiss NGO, promised to donate at least $250,00061
toward the total cost of the swap.62 WWF-U.S. acted as a "funnel"
Development also demonstrated its commitment to economic survival through environmental
awareness. Id. at 177.
Degradation of the forests will eradicate irreplaceable and potentially useful plants,
diminish the island's hydroelectric potential, and weaken industries dependent on forestry and
agriculture. AMERICAN EMBASSY ANTANANARIVO, supra note 13, at 7. This in turn reduces
future potential of the island's natural resources, further impoverishing the island's population.
With a $1,000 annual parks budget for 36 parks, the government is financially incapable of
preventing this downward spiral of environmental and economic pressures. Jolly, supra, at
162. This dilemma created the impetus for the swap agreement with WWF. See generally
Jolly, supra. During the past ten years, WWF has supplemented Madagascar's limited budget
with financial support in excess of $2.6 billion for conservation projects. WWF PROPOSAL TO
USAID, supra note 10, at 7. The swap is intended to "increase the amount of financial support
for conservation in the country, as well as to help reduce Madagascar's debt burden." Id.
59. World Wildlife Fund, supra note 34. The isolation of the island has fostered this
biological diversity.
60. Bollinger, Action Memorandum for the Acting Administrator 1 (Aug. 2, 1989)
(unpublished USAID memorandum pertaining to the Madagascar Debt-for-Nature Swap
Project No. 6870112); see also Letter, supra note 41, at 1, 3.
61. WWF-U.S. agreed to Madagascar's request not to publicly release detailed information
regarding the financial terms of the swap. Telephone Interview, supra note 36. However,
USAID and WWF-U.S. have released general information concerning the financial
arrangements. USAID News Release, supra note 41, at 1-2. Seven commercial banks
participated in the swap. WWF News Release, supra note 54. "WWF will use $950,000 to
redeem approximately $2.1 million of eligible Malagasy debt, at a price of 45 cents on the
dollar." Id. WWF-Int'l "has agreed to redeem eligible debt at 100 percent of its face value for
exchange into Malagasy francs in the form of cash." WWF PROPOSAL TO USAID, supra note
10, at 8. The parties then agreed to hold the proceeds in an interest-bearing account and to
remit all interest earned on the account to USAID. WWF PROPOSAL TO USAID, supra note
10, at 8. WWF agreed to convert the remainder of the debt that it could acquire under the $3
million ceiling over the following two years. Id. The parties targeted $250,000 of USAID
funds to pay for hard currency expenditures associated with the deal. Id. Despite the
statement in the press release that WWF would acquire portions of the debt over the next two
years, WWF-U.S. stated in a telephone interview that it converted all of the Malagasy debt at
once. Telephone Interview, supra note 36. That action is another factor that makes this swap
vulnerable to non-compliance.
WWF has stated that it will contribute a minimum of $250,000 of its own resources
toward the project. WWF PROPOSAL TO USAID, supra note 10, at 22; Letter, supra note 41.
In the grant agreement budget, WWF is obligated to purchase $250,000 of the Malagasy debt,
while USAID is obligated to purchase $700,000 of such debt and contribute $300,000 to other
costs. Letter, supra note 41. Thus, USAID is the principal source of funds for the project, in
contrast to the Bolivian and Philippine swaps, in which WWF-U.S. was the principal donor.
Hereinafter WWF refers to WWF-U.S., which is assumed to be the NGO that negotiated
and signed the swap agreement. This Comment will only draw a distinction between WWF-
U.S. and WWF-Int'! when such a distinction is critical.
62. United States Agency for International Development, Press Release (Feb. 15, 1989)
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between the Malagasy and United States governments. The Malagasy
government's agreement with WWF-U.S. details WWF-U.S.'s obliga-
tion to administer, protect, and plan rural development in parks and
reserves and their buffer zones.63 The swap added a unique feature to
the standard funnel-swap structure: WWF-Int'l was the named party
and signatory to the swap agreement with the Malagasy government
even though WWF-U.S. orchestrated the swap.' Thus, a Swiss NGO
is the official party to a swap that used United States taxpayer funds
to help solve environmental and economic problems in Madagascar.65
The United States government's majority investment in the Mal-
agasy funnel swap is a move toward national ratification of the inter-
national importance of conserving tropical forest habitats.66 The
(Drafted: EHonnold: GS/LP: x78371: 2/15/89: doc# 6440J) [hereinafter USAID Press
Release] (discussing USAID's Debt for Development Initiative). The U.S. government
inaugurated the Debt For Development Initiative in February, 1989. Id. at 1. "Through this
new initiative, AID will support certain programs of nongovernmental organizations in
developing countries through debt exchange transactions." Id. at 1. The legislative authority
for USAID's participation in swaps comes from the International Development and Finance
Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-240, 1989 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (103 Stat) 2492,
which authorizes USAID to make grants to NGO's for swaps.
63. WWF PROPOSAL TO USAID, supra note 10, at 9-16. Generally, WWF responsibilities
are divided into three categories: 1) protected area establishment and management; 2)
identification of key areas for biodiversity protection outside parks and reserves; and 3)
institutional strengthening of the Department of Waters and Forests of the Ministry of Animal
Production, Water, and Forests ("MPAEF"). Id. at 6, 10, 14, 15. WWF activities under the
first category include "boundary demarcation, development of management plans, physical
infrastructure and buffer zone projects, nature interpretation, environmental education,
training and research." Id. at 10. In the second category of responsibilities, WWF will
augment a team of specialists to "identify natural habitat conservation management priorities
outside parks and reserves." Id. at 15. In addition, a specialist hired by WWF will
"administer the disbursement of local currency funds generated by the swap, monitor the
activities supported by the swap and develop proposals for new conservation projects in
currently unprotected areas." Id. The third category of responsibilities requires allocation of
swap-generated funds to enhance the MPAEF's technical capacity, pay salaries, train
personnel, and purchase materials and equipment to strengthen management of the protected
forests. Id. at 16.
64. Telephone Interview, supra note 36.
65. Letter, supra note 41, at 3.
66. In addition to the tropical forest's contribution to consumer goods (a plant grown in
the tropical forest is present in one out of four over-the-counter pharmaceutical products),
tropical forests provide global environmental services such as helping to stabilize the climate at
the global level. N. MYERS, supra note 6, at 7-8, 10. Tropical forests absorb solar radiation,
but when cleared they reflect, thereby contributing to an increase in "shininess" of the plant's
surface, or an "albedo effect." Id. at 10. The increase in albedo disrupts wind currents and
convection patterns, leading to a decrease in moisture in areas far from the forests, such as
North America's grain growing regions. Id. In addition, the burning of the forests is causing a
75% percent increase in carbon dioxide emissions that contribute to the controversial "green
house effect." Daily Telegraph, Dec. 15, 1989, at 11, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni
File. The tropical forest also is a "primary source" of new animals and plants. N. Myers,
supra note 6, at 12. Scientists discover more new types of organisms in tropical forests than in
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Malagasy swap is a result of the United States government's Debt for
Development Initiative,67 which is part of the International Develop-
ment and Finance Act of 1989.68 The Debt for Development Initia-
tive formalizes funnel-swap structures and contributes taxpayer funds
to finance them.6 9 Several signs suggest an increase in governmental
funding of debt-for-nature swaps. At the Paris Summit of the Arch, a
meeting of several heads-of-state organized to resolve international
economic problems, President Bush signed the Economic Declaration
of July 16, 1989, acknowledging debt-for-nature swaps as a useful tool
for environmental protection; 70 the Brady Plan to reduce the foreign
debt of developing nations calls for more creative debt solutions; 71 the
Internal Revenue Code now makes banks' donation of debt to conser-
vation organizations more economically viable;72 the Senate recently
passed a Debt-for-Nature Bill;73 President Bush recently acknowl-
all the other areas of the planet combined. Id. In fact, if one stood in the tropical forest for a
few hours with a net, one would probably discover an insect unknown to science. Id.; Daily
Telegraph, supra.
In Madagascar, the tropical forest deforestation contributes to the Malagasy fuelwood
crisis, watershed soil erosion, and dam and stream sedimentation. It also reduces agricultural
productivity and decreases the general level of human welfare. Xinhua Gen. Overseas News
Serv., No. 1201083 (Dec. 1, 1989), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
67. USAID Press Release, supra note 62, at 1.
68. Pub. L. No. 101-240, 1989 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (103 Stat.) 2492.
69. USAID DEBT FOR DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE, supra note 51, at 1-2.
70. Summit of the Arch, 89 DEP'T ST. BULL. 15 (1989).
71. Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady "urged the parties to be creative in implementing
his strategy, saying, 'there is no one right way' to craft a debt reduction and new money
package given the differing needs of countries." Wash. Post, Sept. 27, 1989, at A28, col. 5.
The Brady plan is an "acknowledgment that the earlier strategy, developed in 1985 by James
A. Baker III... had failed." N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1990, at Al, col. 5. Mr. Baker's plan called
for additional bank lending to countries engaging in full-scale economic overhaul. Id. The
new Brady Plan represents the first government recognition that third world debt, amounting
to $1.3 trillion dollars, must be diminished. Id.
72. Comment, Revenue Ruling 87-124: Treasury's Flawed Interpretation of Debt-for-
Nature Swaps, 43 U. MIAMI. L. REV. 721 (1989). To encourage debt-for-nature swaps, the
United States Department of the Treasury announced that it intends to 'construe liberally'
Rev. Rul. 87-124 1987-2 C.B. 205. Id. at 724. This interpretation was a significant change
from the Internal Revenue Service's traditional interpretation because it allows lenders who
donate debt to conservation organizations to obtain a deduction equal to their full cost basis in
the debt. Id. at 725. In the past, banks would receive a deductible loss for the difference
between the value and sale of the debt. Now the bank receives a deduction for a loss on a bad
debt and a deduction for a charitable contribution. Id.; see also Cody, supra note 17, at 27
(describing Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205); Hyde, US. Taxes: The Issues 2 (unpublished
brochure available from World Wildlife Fund, Washington, D.C. 20037) (outlining tax
treatment of swaps); Wall St. J., Nov. 19, 1987, at 44, col. 23; Letter from M. Peter
McPherson, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, to Senator John Chafee (Jan. 13, 1988).
73. International Development and Finance Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-240, 1989 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (103 Stat.) 2492. This Act recognizes that for swaps to be
truly effective, they will have to be negotiated by governments, because non-government debt
accounts for merely 1/10 of one percent of the $1.3 trillion foreign debt. San Francisco
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edged that the United States government will fund more debt-for-
nature swaps to reduce Latin American debt;74 and, in October 1990,
Congress authorized swaps for approximately $1.7 billion in debts
incurred in the purchase of subsidized food.75 Furthermore, the
United States government finally appears to be acknowledging the
intertwining significance of the environment and economic health for
development: The debt-for-nature swap concept "turns a debt burden
into an opportunity for creative development programs, in this case
for conservation of tropical forests and biodiversity."76
C. The Significance of Investment Risk and Expropriation for
Funnel Swaps
Although debt-for-nature swaps do not provide pecuniary
returns, they are still "investments" in the host country. In the Debt
for Development Initiative funnel-swap structure, the NGO acts like
a corporation that has negotiated a concession agreement with a for-
eign host government to extract natural resources, such as oil or min-
erals, from the foreign host government's territory.77 Although many
similarities exist between the concession agreement and funnel swap,
an important distinction between them is that in the funnel swap, the
NGO "investor" uses taxpayer funds to finance a majority of its
Chron., Apr. 24, 1990, at A23, col. 1. Thus the Act "directs the Treasury Secretary and
United States representatives to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to 'actively
promote, coordinate, and facilitate debt-for-nature exchanges.' " Id.; Nature Swap Bill Faces
Uncertain Future, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, July 31, 1989, at 5; INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR,
supra note 41, at 4. Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.) and Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations Chairpersons, Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.) and Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), sponsored the
Bill, which essentially gives Congressional approval for grants made by the Agency for
International Development to environmental groups for the purchase of commercial bank
debt. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, supra, at 5.
74. President's Address, supra note 42, at 4. "The White House is backing a bold program
to channel billions of dollars that Latin American governments owe Washington into local
conservation projects." N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1991, at B5, col. 4.
75. Id. at B5, col. 4. Furthermore, Washington insiders expect President Bush to ask that
the government fund the swaps with loans that USAID, the Export-Import Bank, and the
Commodity Credit Corporation made to subsidize United States exports. Id.
76. USAID News Release, supra note 41; see also Summit of the Arch, supra note 70, at 13,
16. The July 16, 1989 declaration that President Bush signed also recognizes that
deforestation damages the atmosphere. It calls for sustainable forest management practices,
and the preservation of the forests and its species. It also gives strong support to the Tropical
Forest Action Plan, designed in 1988 by the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization, The World Bank, The United Nations Development, and the World Resources
Institute to halt deforestation by promoting sustainable development. Saule, Environment:
Increase in Deforestation Rate Sparks Harm, Inter Press Service, Sept. 11, 1990, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
77. Voss, supra note 58, at 686-87.
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investment. 78
The risks associated with the mineral extraction concession
agreement, such as the risk of expropriation 79 inherent in any invest-
ment abroad, especially investments in developing countries, °8 are sig-
nificant in the funnel swap as well. Both concession agreements and
funnel swaps are especially vulnerable to losses from expropriation
because of their long-term involvement with the host country's natu-
ral resources.8 '
The Malagasy government is no stranger to expropriation. Dur-
ing the 1970's, it authorized large-scale expropriations, including
Caltex and Exxon Oil refining and distribution facilities and a Hilton
Hotel.8 2  None of the corporations received compensation from the
Malagasy government.8" Compensation would have been an appro-
priate remedy, because it would have returned the funds that the
investor had committed to the project for appropriate reinvestment
elsewhere.84 As to the host territory, although the project's opera-
tions remain the same, the host government becomes the new owner
and thus entitled to all future revenues. From an equitable stand-
point, it should be required to pay for this benefit.
However, even if Madagascar agreed to compensate WWF in the
78. USAID Press Release, supra note 62, at 3.
79. Shubin & Gibby, supra note 38, at 70. Participation by a foreign investor in foreign
investment activities increases exposure to political and economic risks. Id. "Investors expose
themselves to the transfer risk related to the remittance of capital dividends... and to political
risks normally associated with an investment for ten years or more in a developing country."
Id.
Debt-for-equity swap risks and environmental threats magnify the vulnerability
of the firm. Nationalist sentiments, rampant inflation partially fueled by other
swaps, currency swings, and uncertainty about how the host government will
manage its economy in the future are a few of the risks to be evaluated by
decision makers before any swap is approved.
Ganitsky & Lema, Foreign Investment Through Debt-Equity Swaps, SLOAN MGMT. REV, Win-
ter 1988, at 21, 27-28.
80. Voss, supra note 58, at 688.
81. Id. at 695.
82. U.S. Dep't of State, Investment Climate Statement for Madagascar 4 (1988)
(unpublished report available from Overseas Private Investment Corporation, Washington,
D.C.).
83. Id.
84. Just compensation is defined as an "amount equivalent to the value of the property
taken" and requires that it "be paid at the time of taking, or within a reasonable time
thereafter with interest from the date of taking, and in a form economically usable by the
foreign national." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF UNITED
STATES § 712 (1987). Recent international decisions provide a more precise definition of
"adequate compensation." See International Group v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 4 Iran-U.S.
C.T.R. 96, 105 (1983) (adopting the traditional norm that aliens are entitled to "the value of
the property taken" and that going concern or fair market value must be considered in making
the determination).
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event of an expropriation of WWF's rights under the debt-for-nature
swap, the remedy would be ineffective."5 Debt-for-nature swaps have
two purposes: to reduce foreign debt and to protect endangered habi-
tats. 6 The economic purpose is short term; the environmental pur-
pose is long term. 7 Although the WWF agreement with USAID
specifies only a three-year period within which the USAID-funded
WWF projects are to be completed,8 8 the swap investor's environmen-
tal management projects in the fragile tropical forest habitats are to
continue indefinitely. 9 Moreover, WWF itself intends to continue
privately funding and administering the project indefinitely.90 The
NGO's investment is effective only in Madagascar. Furthermore,
money alone will not address the environmental purpose of the
swap-the halt of deforestation in Madagascar's tropical forest. If
Madagascar, in an effort to relieve domestic economic pressures, 91
expropriates WWF's rights to protect and administer 92 the swap terri-
tory, it is unlikely that Madagascar would continue the preservation
activities. In that event the parties would be where they started, with
Madagascar's tropical forest at risk of depletion and exploitation for
agriculture, mining, or other profitable commercial projects.9"
Two characteristics of the Malagasy funnel swap indicate that it
is more susceptible to expropriation than traditional debt-for-nature
swap agreements. First, no Malagasy NGO participant coordinates
this swap in Madagascar because NGO's are incompatible with the
Malagasy form of government.94 In most debt-for-nature swaps, a
85. Although WWF-Int'l signed the debt-for-nature swap agreement this Comment
assumes that WWF-U.S. would be the proper party to receive compensation. See supra note
41.
86. Letter, supra note 41, at 3.
87. See generally WWF PROPOSAL TO USAID, supra note 10, at 22. Jean Hacken's letter
incorporates the proposal into the grant agreement. Letter, supra note 41.
88. WWF PROPOSAL TO USAID, supra note 10, at 8; Letter, supra note 41, at 1, 3.
89. WWF PROPOSAL TO USAID, supra note 10, at 21.
90. Id. at 22.
91. Madagascar is one of the poorest countries in Africa and Asia and is even poorer than
Haiti, the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. Id. at 4. For information regarding
Madagascar's domestic economic pressures, see supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
92. WWF PROPOSAL TO USAID, supra note 10.
93. "[P]resident Ratsiraka is under pressure to put lucre ahead of lemurs." Knox, No
Nation, 74 SIERRA 80-81 (1989). A titanium deposit in one of Madagascar's last virgin forests
is attracting the attention of a British Petroleum subsidiary. Id. The deposit "could erase the
nation's $30 million annual trade deficit." Id. Madagascar is rich in mica, graphite, and
chromite and has "potential for" bauxite, ilmenite, uranium, iron ore and coal production.
U.S. DEP'T OF ST. BUREAU PUB. AFFAIRS., BACKGROUND NOTES: MADAGASCAR (1987).
Amoco and Occidental Petroleum already are undertaking extensive exploratory drilling
efforts. Petro-Canada also has expressed an interest in tar sands exploration. Id. at 6.
94. Telephone Interview, supra note 36. One commentator stated that "[o]ne of the most
important limitations in concluding a successful transaction would seem to be the presence of
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local NGO coordinates the transaction to alleviate a perceived poten-
tial threat to host country sovereignty. 95 Without a Malagasy NGO's
management assistance, the conservation activities are more suscepti-
ble to nationalistic threats. Second, for political reasons, Madagas-
car's socialist government 96 required WWF-Int'l rather than WWF-
U.S. to be the named NGO party.97 Madagascar's leadership is thus
already politically uncomfortable, at least publicly, with United States
involvement in its natural resource management.
The prudent response to this risk, especially when taxpayer funds
are being used, is for NGO investors to factor the likelihood of expro-
priation into their investment decisions. This has been the practice of
foreign investors undertaking debt-for-equity swaps in Latin America
and Caribbean countries" experiencing the same type of political99
and economic" ° instability as Madagascar. Like the debt-for-equity
investor, the debt-for-nature investor has made an extremely valuable
investment-the conservation of a unique habitat. Yet, unlike expro-
priated debt-for-equity investments, compensation is an ineffective
remedy when the host government decides not to comply with the
agreement.' 0 ' It is even less effective when the United States govern-
an effective partner [an NGO] in the debtor [developing country]." Comment, supra note 17,
at 335. A National Wildlife Federation official has stated that the primary problem concerning
debt donations in developing countries with no effective conservation organizations is the
assurance of the proper use of the funds. Therefore donations in such countries should be
viewed with "extreme caution." Id. at 335.
95. B. Bramble & B. Millikan, External Debt, Democratization, and Natural Resources in
Developing Countries: The Case of Brazil 9 n.4 (June 27, 1989) (unpublished report available
from the National Wildlife Federation, Washington, D.C. 20036)
96. This refusal was the result of political concerns. Telephone Interview, supra note 36.
97. Id.
98. Shubin & Gibby, supra note 38, at 42-43. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Jamaica,
Uruguay, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Mexico have official debt-for-equity programs.
Id. at 49-61.
99. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 82, at 3-4 ("Madagascar is still developing
politically."). Admiral Didier Ratsiraka, came to power following a revolution in 1972 which
ended with the assassination of Col. Rasimandrava. EUROPA PUBLICATIONS LTD., supra note
11, at 1675. In January 1989, a constitutional amendment enabled Ratsiraka to reschedule the
next presidential election from November to March. Id. at 1676. In February, restrictions on
the Freedom of the Press were ended, and in March the President announced the permanent
abolition of press censorship. Id. In May 1990, a coup attempt was staged against President
Ratsiraka. Madagascar Coup Attempt Mobilizes the Masses Via Radio, DEF. & FOR. AFF.
WEEKLY, May 21, 1990, at 6.
100. See generally EUROPA PUBLICATIONS LTD., supra note 11, at 1676-77 (providing
figures detailing Madagascar's tenuous economic situation); U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 82,
at 4 (describing Madagascar's economic problems).
101. Economic pressures result in the failure of host governments to comply with debt-for-
nature agreements. For example, Ecuador has bowed to the plans of a subsidiary of Dupont,
Conoco Ecuador Ltd., to pump oil from the tropical rain forests. Action Access, GREENPEACE,
Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 22. Conoco's plans threaten Huarani Indian homelands and the Yasuni
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mental agency, the source of the investment funds, is not the proper
party to receive the remedy.
III. EXISTING REMEDIES
If one's goal is to preserve precious natural resources, compensa-
tion for an expropriation of conservation rights is simply ineffective.
Nevertheless, compensation may be the NGO's only remedy for an
expropriation of those rights. Moreover, if compensation is ineffective
for the normal debt-for-nature swap, it is absolutely worthless in a
funnel swap. The majority financier, the funding state, is not even a
party to the swap. It has no rights to assert against the expropriating
host state. Rather, the NGO, who is the actual party to the agree-
ment, is the only one who can bring the compensation action. Thus,
the funding state's taxpayers have no adequate remedy. This reality is
vividly borne out of the Malagasy swap, discussed below. This Sec-
tion analyzes possible remedies under the domestic law of both Mada-
gascar and the United States, as well as international relief. As might
be expected, none currently provides an adequate remedy. 102
A. Malagasy Law: Domestic Law of the Swap's Host Country
In establishing the right to expropriate 113 the Malagasy Constitu-
tion addresses the issue of the state's right to intervene in commercial
activities. 1°4 It contains "escape clauses"'' 5 giving the state the right
to intervene in commercial activities when the state judges any com-
mercial activity to be inconsistent with the best interests of the peo-
ple.106 Based on this provision, the Malagasy government could argue
that the funnel swap is a commercial activity because it is based on
National Park, because part of the plan includes cutting a new road into the park which will
bring pollution, logging, and colonists into the area. Id. Ironically, the World Bank, an
institution that could choose to be a supporter of sustainable long-term development, and of
global environmental interests, might give a $100 million dollar loan for oil development in the
Ecuadorian Amazon. Id.
In Mexico, the 1,278-square-mile Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve, which the Mexican
government established more than ten years ago as a protected area, is now threatened. N.Y.
Times, July 10, 1990, at B7, col. 4. It is part of the largest tropical rain forest in North
America, the Lacandona. Id. The destruction of the region accelerated in the early 1980's
with the construction of a road that parallels the Guatemalan border. Id. The road has
brought settlers, some of whom burn the jungle to plant crops. Id.
102. Although choice-of-law and choice-of-forum issues are also important and related, the
discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this Comment.
103. WWF PROPOSAL TO USAID, supra note 10, at 9-16.
104. CONSTITUTION DE LA R-PUBLIQUE D-MOCRATIQUE DE MADAGASCAR (DEUXIEMIt





the commercial swap of debt held by a private commercial bank. If
the Malagasy government considers a swap to be a "commercial
activity," it easily could determine that the domestic economic pres-
sures 10 7 require the government to permit commercial use of the trop-
ical forests at a rate exceeding the limits WWF established in the
agreement. 08 Accordingly, WWF's right to protect and administer"°
swap territory would violate the Malagasy Constitution because these
rights are "inconsistent with the best interests of the people," and the
government legally could suspend the long-term habitat protection
goals of the swap. Under the Malagasy Constitution, the state is not
required to compensate WWF. Thus, WWF would have to argue
either that the swap is a development, rather than a "commercial
activity," so that the Constitution's escape clauses would not apply,
or that a commercial activity must have a pecuniary, rather than an
environmental protection, motive. Of course, once the government is
facing mounting political pressure to use its natural resources for eco-
nomic development, a reading of the Malagasy Constitution favorable
to WWF is unlikely.
After it nationalized foreign investment in the 1970's,110 Mada-
gascar could not attract desperately needed foreign investment. In
1985, the government of President Didier Ratsiraka, in an effort to
lessen foreigners' fears about the safety of investing in Madagascar,
instituted the Code of Investments."' The Code provides that if the
government nationalizes property, the investor receives compensation
based on the value of invested capital. " 2 Furthermore, the Code spe-
cifically states that Malagasy law is the exclusive source of law gov-
erning investments performed in Madagascar. 1 3 WWF could argue
that, under the Code, debt-for-nature swaps qualify as "investments"
107. American Embassy Antananarivo, supra note 13, at 3, 4; see also supra note 91.
108. See WWF PROPOSAL TO USAID, supra note 10, at 17-19. Such a decision is hardly
hypothetical when the Malagasy government is faced with friction between its environmental
conservation goals and its bleak domestic economic situation, including a growing poverty-
stricken population. For example, Costa Rica has faced the choice between maintaining the
boundaries of a national reserve or reforming them to permit oil drilling. Curtis, Director of
the Latin American Division of the Nature Conservancy, Remarks at Smithsonian Institution
Conference, Debt-for-Nature: Overdrawn Natural Resources (June 27, 1990) (available from
The Smithsonian Institution). Initially Costa Rica preserved the reserve's boundaries;
however, its next decision may be different. Id.
109. WWF PROPOSAL TO USAID, supra note 10, at 9-16.
110. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 82, at 6.
111. CODE OF INVESTMENTS, L. No. 85.001 (Madag.) (translation available from Overseas
Private Investment Corporation, Washington, D.C.).
112. Id. art. 8.
113. Id. art. 28. In addition, article 39 of the Code states that if the terms of the agreement
require arbitration, Malagasy law will apply. Id. art. 39. But "[s]hould there be no
appropriate [Malagasy] legislation, the ad hoc arbitral committee shall refer to general
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that merit the Code's protection and relief' 1 4
Using the Code as applicable law, however, is problematic. First,
the swap is not a typical investment. Second, there are two possible
governmental "intervention" strategies. Madagascar could refuse to
comply with the swap agreement within or following the three-year
funding period, which is somewhat of a limitations period. If it fails
to comply within the three-year period, and the Code applies because
the swap is deemed an environmental "investment," then Madagascar
would be required to compensate WWF; however, the Code does not
specify time limits for Madagascar's payments.' In any event,
USAID may not have rights to any compensation that WWF receives
because the agreement does not require WWF to reimburse USAID
in the event of compensation. 16
On the other hand, the Malagasy government could comply with
the agreement for the entire three-year period and then expropriate
WWF's management plan rights. As long as WWF has utilized the
grant funds properly, it is unclear whether WWF would be entitled to
compensation even if the swap is deemed an "investment" under the
Code. If so, USAID would not be entitled to any of these funds
principles, custom, and appropriate general jurisprudence." Id. Arguably, this phrase
incorporates customary international law.
The effect of the imposition of Malagasy law under article 39 is similar to the use of a
Calvo Clause in Latin America. Calvo Clauses have long been used in concession agreements
between Latin American governments and aliens "under which the alien agrees not to seek the
diplomatic protection of his own state and submits matters arising from the contract to the
local jurisdiction." I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 546-47
(1979). Thus, a debt-for-nature swap agreement between a United States NGO and a Latin
American government would probably also provide for the application of local law.
114. Article 1 of the Code states, "[The Code] is applicable under identical conditions to
private-sector companies, public-sector companies, and to those companies in the private
sector called upon to act on behalf of the State." CODE OF INVESTMENTS art. 1 (Madag.). It
further states that "[p]rivate investors can operate in all sectors of economic activity" with the
exception of certain activities "in which the State has the exclusive right to act." Id. Among
the activities reserved to the State are "activities potentially affecting national security or law
and order." Id. But even in the reserved sectors, "the State can call upon private sector
operators." Id. Thus, one can argue that debt-for-nature swaps are covered by the Code. The
contrary argument would assert that law relating to debt-for-nature swaps is sui generis, that
is, unique. If sui generis, the Code would not apply, and the Malagasy Constitution would
permit state intervention if the swap is inconsistent with the best interest of the people.
CONSTITUTION DE LA RtPUBLIQUE DtMOCRATIQUE DE MADAGASCAR (DEUXIEMt
RtPUBLIQUE) tit. II, art. 30.
115. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 82, at 6.
116. Letter, supra note 41, at 3-5. This letter states that the AID grant "be administered in
accordance with the terms and conditions as set forth in the Schedule, the Program
Description, and the Standard Provisions, and that uncommitted funds must be returned to
AID. Id. at 1. However, the agreement does not require WWF to reimburse AID for the
grant if WWF receives compensation from Madagascar because of government interference
that expropriates WWF's rights.
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because the three-year grant period would have expired. Finally,
WWF may want to distance itself from relying upon the "invest-
ments" rationale by searching for legal rights of foreign parties to pro-
tect natural resources. Madagascar's civil code, however, does not
address these rights. In a civil law jurisdiction, in the absence of such
a Code provision, WWF would lack standing to sue the government.
Therefore, WWF would likely have no remedy. Emerging from this
analysis is the realization that USAID granted taxpayer funds to
WWF for a project that received no guarantees, and WWF's only pos-
sible remedy against Madagascar under Malagasy law, pecuniary
compensation, would not compensate it adequately for a project
intended to save endangered tropical forest habitats.' 17 Even in the
best of all worlds, if WWF received compensation and reimbursed
USAID, the tropical forests would still disappear. Hence, the Mala-
gasy Code does not provide either a reliable or an effective remedy for
expropriation of debt-for-nature swaps.
B. Applicable United States Law and Its Remedies
The following subsections detail possible United States remedies
for an expropriation of a debt-for-nature swap. The remedies are
weak, at best. Even they would not apply to the Malagasy funnel-
swap agreement because the United States is not a party to it. An
examination of United States law may be helpful, however, in the
event of expropriations of other debt-for-nature swaps to which the
United States is a party." 
8
1. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
Because the sovereign government of Madagascar would be the
defendant in an expropriation action, WWF first would have to sur-
mount the requirements of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
("FSIA")" 9 to institute an action against the Republic of Madagascar
in United States courts. The FSIA ensures that sovereign immunity
decisions are made on legal, rather than political, grounds. 120 The
FSIA confers immunity on a defendant foreign state, its agencies, or
its political subdivisions. 12 1 The FSIA, however, does have important
exceptions, such as the "commercial activities" and "expropriation"
exceptions, which permit the jurisdiction of the United States
117. Letter, supra note 41, attachment 2 (program description).
118. See CONSERVATION INT'L, supra note 36, at 13-18.
119. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988).
120. Martropico Compania Naviera S.A. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas
Bumi Negara (Pertamina), 428 F. Supp. 1035, 1037 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
121. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1604 (1988).
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courts122 in certain circumstances. 23 Unfortunately, the exceptions
do not apply to the Malagasy funnel swap.
2 4
The threshold issue in deciding whether a United States court
122. The plaintiff must prove that the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. In
Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 308 (2d Cir.
1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
evaluated the personal jurisdiction requirement of the Act: "[E]ach finding of personal
jurisdiction under the FSIA requires ... a due process scrutiny of the court's power to exercise
its authority over a particular defendant."
123. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1988).
124. The FSIA states that foreign states are not immune from the jurisdiction of United
States courts:
[In any case] in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on
in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or
upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct
effect on the United States.
Id. § 1605(a)(2).
Although the contracts between Madagascar and WWF to convert the debt might fall
into the commercial activities exception of the FSIA, contracts between WWF and Madagas-
car to preserve the tropical forests would not because they are not for profit. Activities carried
on for profit, or those in which a private party may engage, usually fall into the "commercial
activities" definition. Id. § 1605(a)(2). The FSIA defines "commercial activity" as "either a
regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act." Id.
§ 1603(d). The FSIA further states that "[t]he commercial character of the activity shall be
determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act,
rather than by reference to its purpose." Id. If the activity is one in which only a government
could participate, then the foreign government receives immunity. Brazosport Towing Co.,
Inc. v. 3,838 Tons of Sorghum Laden, 607 F. Supp. I (S.D. Tex. 1984), aff'd, 790 F.2d 891
(5th Cir. 1986).
The agreement between WWF and the government of Madagascar was a development
contract, neither one for profit nor one in which a private party could have participated on
behalf of the Malagasy government. Furthermore, "establishing terms and conditions for
removal of natural resources from ... [a foreign government's] territory ... is a 'governmental'
activity" for purpose of the FSIA. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-1605(a)(2); see also Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 477 F. Supp. 553, 567-68 (C.D.
Cal. 1979), aff'd, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
The theory behind the "direct effect" clause of § 1605(2) would not allow a finding of
jurisdiction for a commercial activity. To determine whether a court should hear the case, one
must ask whether the effect was sufficiently direct and in the United States' interests that
Congress would have wanted an American court to hear the case. In the Malagasy funnel
swap, Congress would not have wanted an American court to hear a dispute. If the funnel
swap is not a commercial activity, presumably then the agreement for WWF to conserve and
manage sovereign territory would not fall into the commercial activities exception. Ignoring
the fact that WWF-Int'l. was party to the agreement, the effect of the breach is felt in Mada-
gascar. Consider that WWF-Int'l. of Gland, Switzerland, was party to the agreement, Con-
gress has even less interest in having an American court hear the case.
The expropriation exception would not provide for jurisdiction because this exception
grants United States courts jurisdiction if rights in property are taken in violation of interna-
tional law. The expropriation would violate international law if Madagascar were to expropri-
ate by passing legislation outlawing the swap, or if the expropriation was not for a public
purpose, was discriminatory, or had no provision for prompt, adequate, and effective compen-
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may resolve a dispute under the FSIA is whether such court has per-
sonal jurisdiction. Under International Shoe v. Washington, 25 which
established the "minimum contacts" test for determining personal
jurisdiction, it is unclear whether a single transaction is sufficient to
establish personal jurisdiction. Although some courts have held that
a single transaction is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction,
126
others have held that as long as a single contract has a substantial
connection to the state in which the suit was brought, minimum con-
tacts are established. 127 Even if a United States court found that the
government of Madagascar has sufficient "minimum contacts" to
render personal jurisdiction, it still could avoid hearing a case by
invoking the doctrine of forum non conveniens.128
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a United States
trial court facing a case of Malagasy expropriation of a funnel-swap
agreement could find that because the issue involves a foreign govern-
sation. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 113, at 538, 548. The only property to meet the expropria-
tion exception is that which is
exchanged for [expropriated] property is present in the United States in connec-
tion with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign
state; or that property or any property exchanged for [expropriated] property is
owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that
agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United
States.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1988). However, no commercial activity in the United States is at issue
here. Even if the funnel swap were a commercial activity, it does not meet the other qualifica-
tions for application of this exception. There is no "property exchanged for such property"
present in the United States, or owned or operated by Madagascar that also is "engaged in
commercial activity in the United States." Id. Madagascar exchanged debt for specified rights
to tropical forest territory, and the Malagasy debt is not in the United States or "owned" or
operated by Madagascar or its instrumentality. Therefore, United States courts would not
have jurisdiction under the Act, and even if they did, the only practical remedy would be
attachment under 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (1988), which would be as ineffective as compensation,
because Madagascar does not have substantial assets in the United States and because compen-
sation is an inappropriate remedy. See BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 53 (Aug. 1990) [hereinafter SURVEY OF CUR-
RENT BUSINESS]; U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, OPERATIONS OF U.S. AFFILIATES OF FOR-
EIGN COMPANIES: PRELIMINARY 1988 ESTIMATES (1988) (table A-2) [hereinafter FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES] (detailing Malagasy investment in the United
States).
125. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The United States Supreme Court held that to subject a foreign
corporation to a judgment in personam, due process requires only that the corporation have
"certain minimum contacts with [the territory of the forum], such that the maintenance of the
action does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " Id. at 316
(quoting Miliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
126. Steinway v. Majestic Amusement, 179 F.2d 681, 683 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
947 (1950).
127. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957).
128. See generally M. JANiS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 254 (1988).
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ment defendant 'and its territory, and because much of the evidence is
located in that foreign country, a Malagasy court is a more convenient
forum to decide the dispute. In In re Union Carbide Corporation Gas
Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India,29 the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal on forum non con-
veniens grounds because most of the relevant evidence and events
existed or occurred in 'India and the public interests of India were
greater than those of the United States.130 The same rationale would
likely apply to the expropriation of the Malagasy funnel swap because
the land and the evidence exist in Madagascar, the principal events
occurred there, and Madagascar has strong public policy interests in
the use of its territory. A United States court would hesitate to judge
a foreign nation's use of its own-territory even if United States tax-
payer funds were at issue.
Even if a court found personal jurisdiction and did not invoke
forum non conveniens, any resulting judgment probably would be
unenforceable. The FSIA specifies the remedies that United States
courts can award, such as damages or attachment.13 ' Attachment,
like damages, does not provide effective relief where an investment is
non-pecuniary. A United States court would be unable to enforce
monetary attachment because Madagascar has limited United States
resources to attach. 132 In addition, if Madagascar were pressured into
expropriating the funnel-swap rights because of severe economic dis-
tress, it probably could not afford to pay compensation. 133 Despite
the granting of either remedy, the swap's environmental purposes
would remain frustrated.
2. THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT
If, as anticipated, the FSIA provided a claimant such as WWF
with no relief, the claimant could look for a United States forum
under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Congress passed the
Foreign Assistance Act partially to negate the act of state doctrine,
which holds that "the courts of one country will not sit in judgment
on the acts of the government of another done within its own terri-
129. 809 F.2d 195 (1987), cert. denied, 108 U.S. 871 (1987).
130. Id. at 199-201.
131. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1606, 1609, 1610 (1988).
132. See SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, supra note 124; FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 124.
133. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 82, at 4.
134. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.).
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tory." '1 35 In other words, as reaffirmed in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino,'36 the Supreme Court believes that the executive branch is
most able to review foreign affairs issues.137
The Foreign Assistance Act, however, grants United States juris-
diction in cases in which "a claim of title or other right to property is
asserted by any party including a foreign state... based upon a con-
fiscation or other taking after January 1, 1959. ' I38 As expected,
because the Act is addressed specifically to expropriation, it has mini-
mized the importance of the act of state doctrine, and hence, has per-
mitted United States citizens to assert expropriation claims against a
foreign state in United States courts. 13 9 Unfortunately, the Foreign
Assistance Act would offer little relief to the WWF or, ultimately, to
the United States government, which funded the swap. It basically
suffers from the same problems that Madagascar's domestic law
presents." ° The remedies available in United States courts, namely
monetary or injunctive relief, are likely unenforceable against Mada-
gascar because of its limited assets in the United States. More impor-
tant, money damages, if enforceable, would be inadequate, because
money does not sustain habitats. Precious natural resources would
again be subject to mass destruction.
c. International Law
1. CONVENTIONAL INTERNATIONAL LAW: AGREEMENTS
BETWEEN STATES
The United States is not a party to any agreement that governs
debt-for-nature swaps, 4' including the Malagasy debt-for-nature
swap.'42 Madagascar and the United States did enter into a bilateral
135. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
136. 376 U.S. 398 (1964)..
137. Id. at 428-37.
138. Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1988).
139. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 706 (1962);
Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
dismissed 472 U.S. 934 (1985); Timberland Lumber N.T. & S.A. Co. v. Bank of America, 549
F.2d 597, 608 (9th Cir. 1976); Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres, S.A., 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.
1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947).
140. See supra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
141. A survey of treaties to which the United States is a party reveals that the United States
does not belong to any treaties governing debt-for-nature swaps in the countries in which it has
participated in swaps. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 1990, at
21-24, 51-53, 64-66, 271-72, 195-200 (1990). For a summary of countries in which USAID has
participated in swaps with Arfmerican NGO's, see supra note 41.
142. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 141, at 151-52.
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investment guarantee agreement in 1963,143 but it does not offer pro-
tection for environmental investments. Foreign investment agree-
ments protect foreign investors, by both defining acceptable host-state
behavior vis-a-vis foreign investors and providing remedies for host-
state violations to foreign investors whose government is a party to
the agreement. Even if WWF could persuasively argue that a debt-
for-nature swap is an "investment" for the purposes of the agreement,
WWF's only recourse would be to request the United States to negoti-
ate and ultimately arbitrate the dispute.'" Should the arbitrator pre-
vail in this dispute, the arbitrator would be limited to the remedies
under the applicable law, which, in the case of the Malagasy debt-for-
nature swap, would be Malagasy law. As discussed earlier, 14 each of
those remedies is ineffective for the debt-for-nature swap investment.
As an environmental investor, WWF also might look to the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation ("OPIC") 46 for relief.
OPIC provides investors with the opportunity to purchase insur-
ance 147 on its investments in certain approved countries, of which
Madagascar is one.'48 Once again, however, the obvious relief-com-
pensation-is simply inadequate when one remembers that the pur-
pose of the program is natural resource conservation and
management.
2. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
If no bilateral agreement provides a remedy for expropriation,
143. Agreement Relating to Investment Guarantees, Exchange of Notes at Tananarive, July
26, 1963, United States-The Malagasy Republic, 14 U.S.T. 1073, T.I.A.S. No. 5407.
144. Id. at 1074.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 91-97.
146. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation ("OPIC") is an "agency of the United
States under the policy guidelines of the Secretary of State." 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1988). Chief
among its functions is the encouragement of private investment in developing countries that
are "friendly with the United States by guaranteeing investments by United States citizens,
corporations, partnerships or other associations, substantially beneficially owned by United
States citizens." Id.
147. OPIC's three classes of investment insurance protect against: 1) the risk of
inconvertibility of currency, 2) the risk of expropriation, and 3) political violence, including
risk of war, revolution, or insurrection, or civil strife. 22 U.S.C. § 2194(1) (1988). The
insurance against expropriation
includes, but is not limited to, any abrogation, repudiation, or impairment by a
foreign government of its own contract with an investor with respect to a project,
where such abrogation, repudiation, or impairment is not caused by the
investor's own fault or misconduct, and materially adversely affects the
continued operation of the project.
Id. § 2198(b).
148. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MARKETING IN MADAGASCAR 25 (1988).
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the claimant can look to customary international law. 149 Under cus-
tomary international law, countries may expropriate but must pay
compensation in return for the expropriated property. 5 ' Under the
principles of economic self-determination' and permanent sover-
eignty over natural resources,' 52 customary international law provides
that a state has an absolute right to expropriate foreign property.
15 3
Thus, should Madagascar decide to expropriate WWF's rights to
"protect and administer"' 154 under the debt-for-nature swap, Mada-
gascar would have support under customary international law to do
SO.
In that event, WWF could bring a dispute before either the Inter-
national Court of Justice' 55 or an arbitrator. 56 Should the court or
arbitrator find that Madagascar, or any other debt-for-nature swap
host state, has expropriated the debt-for-nature swap rights, custom-
ary international law provides three remedies: restitution (or specific
performance), a declaration of rights, or a claim for compensation or
damages. '57 Restitution is viewed as "largely impractical" where con-
tracts require "continuing performance in the territory of the state
party when the state has decided that the public good requires the
variation or termination of the contract."'5 8 A claim for declaration
of rights is often a disguised claim for restitution, so the only real
149. U.N. CHARTER art. 38 (prescribing the law of the International Court of Justice).
150. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 712 & reporters' notes 1, 2 (1986).
151. Award on the Merits in Dispute Between Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. & Gov't of
Libyan Arab Republic, 17 I.L.M. 1, 21 (1978) [hereinafter Libya-Oil Cos. Arbitration].
152. Id. at 27-29 (discussing Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res.
3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974); Permanent Sovereignty
Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/
5217 (1962); Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 3171, 1 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 30) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9400 (1973); Declaration on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201, 6 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 3, U.N. Doc.
A/9559 (1974). The principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources includes the
right to take privately owned property for the benefit of national development. Z. KRONFOL,
PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 22 (1972) (discussing G.A. Res. 626 (vii), 7 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 18, U.N. Doc. A/236 (1952)).
153. Libya-Oil Cos. Arbitration, supra note 151, at 21.
154. WWF PROPOSAL TO USAID, supra note 10, at 9-16.
155. The possibility of having the opportunity to present this case before the International
Court of Justice is minimal because the Statute of the International Court of Justice does not
provide for compulsory jurisdiction. STATUTE OF THE INT'L COURT OF JUSTICE art. 36, 86,
59 Stat. 1031. A state must consent to jurisdiction before it becomes a party to a case. Thus,
unless Madagascar would have consented to open-ended jurisdiction, it would not agree to
jurisdiction on the ground that there is no claim. Id.
156. M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 204-15 (1982).
157. Bowett, Claims Between States and Private Entities: The Twilight Zone of
International Law 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 929, 937 (1986).
158. Id. at 938.
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remedy available is a monetary award. 59 The result is that custom-
ary law, which essentially awards monetary compensation or dam-
ages,' also fails to provide adequate remedies in the debt-for-nature
swap transaction. Thus, because debt-for-nature swaps are relatively
innovative, each source of law leads to some inappropriate remedy,
because those remedies arose as complements to traditional foreign
investments.
Nonetheless, customary law does offer a glimmer of hope.
Despite the impracticability of restitution and the inadequacy of com-
pensation, a sole arbitrator in the Texaco Overseas Petroleum Com-
pany dispute with the Libya Arab Republic1 61 awarded specific
performance (restitutio in integrum) for the expropriation of a long-
term investment, a concession agreement. 62 The arbitrator found
that Libya's actions constituted breach of contract and an expropria-
tion of the deeds of concession, despite United Nations General
Assembly Resolutions concerning permanent sovereignty over natural
resources. 63 In so holding, the arbitrator obliged Libya to perform
its contractual obligations with private foreign investors by using its
natural resources for the benefit of the foreign oil companies.164 One
wonders how a court or an arbitrator would apply Libya Oil to a debt-
for-nature swap agreement, which like a concession agreement, is a
long-term investment agreement.
65
Although not yet indicative of customary international law, the
159. Id. A plaintiff suing for a declaration of rights is often just seeking the authority to
force the defendant expropriator to perform the obligations arising under the contract.
160. Compensation is the remedy for a lawful taking or termination of contract; a "damage
award" is the remedy for an unlawful taking or termination. For information regarding
methods for computing the amount due, see id. at 938-42.
161. Libya-Oil Cos. Arbitration, supra note 151, at 37.
162. Id. at 31-32, 34.
163. Id. at 37. The Arbitrator applied customary international law to a dispute arising
from a concession agreement between Libya and several American Oil companies, although
the concession agreement specified Saudi Arabian law in a choice-of-law clause in the
agreement. Id. at 8-9.
164. Id. at 31-37.
165. Id. at 10-11.
[F]rom a formal point of view and prima facie, the Deeds of Concession in the
dispute were of a contractual nature since they expressed an agreement of the
wills of the conceding State and of the concession holders....
"From the international point of view, a concession, in particular, is simply
a contract .... A concession, it is true, may not be a contract at all"; this is only
true when it has been "conferred by and contained in a legislative instrument."
Id. (quoting Mann, Contrats entre Etats et Personnes Privdes Etrangires.: The Theoretical
Approach' Towards the Law Governing Contracts Between States and Private Persons, REV.
BELGE D.I. 562, 564 (1975)).
1222
DEBT-FOR-NA TURE SWAPS
Libya Oil holding would provide specific performance to WWF 16 6 if
Madagascar unlawfully expropriated WWF's rights under the debt-
for-nature swap agreement. 167  Because not every expropriation
amounts to breach, however, a trier of fact would have to determine
whether Madagascar's expropriation was unlawful. 168  Madagascar
could not successfully argue that the debt-for-nature swap is an
administrative contract, which "can give rise to amendments or even
abrogation on the part of the contracting state,"' 69 because adminis-
trative contract theory' does not exist in international law. 170 Mada-
gascar could argue that its sovereignty entitles it to abrogate,' 7' or
that the United Nations Resolution 1803 on Natural Resources,
72
which acknowledges a country's sovereign claim to its resources,
allows it to abrogate the agreeement. These last two defenses may
have merit. However, distinct characteristics of this swap agreement
would make Libya Oil's specific performance remedy a significant vio-
lation of Madagascar's sovereignty and also would contravene the
intention of United Nations Resolution 1803. First, the Libya Oil
deeds of concession had specific time limits, 173 unlike the Malagasy
funnel-swap agreement. Second, the deeds of concession contained a
non-aggravation clause which assured Texaco that Libya would not
alter the contractual rights except by mutual agreement. 7 The swap
agreement had no such clause. Third, the concessions were commer-
cial, not environmental. Fourth, unlike Libya, which retained the
functional exercise of its sovereignty in various obligations imposed
on it as a contracting party, 17 Madagascar did not retain such mani-
166. Realistically, WWF-Int'l would be the party entitled to specific performance under the
Malagasy funnel-swap. Thus, the award would not even compensate United States taxpayers
for their environmental investment in Madagascar, assuming that the United States NGO did
not sign the swap agreement.
167. There was no arbitration clause in the Malagasy debt-for-nature swap agreement.
Thus, if a court were to apply Libya Oil to a Malagasy expropriation, Madagascar could argue
that the decision of the arbitrator in Libya Oil does not apply to a non-arbitration case. WWF
PROPOSAL TO USAID, supra note 10.
168. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 532-40 (1979).
169. Libya-Oil Cos. Arbitration, supra note 151, at 25. The theory of administrative
contracts is of French origin. It gives the public authority the unilateral right to alter or
abrogate public service concessions. Id. Madagascar could argue that because the swap's
purpose is to provide a public service-namely, to preserve the tropical forest-so that the
swap is a public service concession.
170. Id.
171. See id. at 21.
172. Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 17) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).
173. Id. at 24, 26.
174. Id. at 24.
175. Id. at 26.
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festations of its sovereignty. Instead, Madagascar merely specified
that the Malagasy Department of Water and Forests ("MPAEF")
would retain "overall titular responsibility" of certain portions of the
project. 1
76
Because of these significant differences, if a court or arbitrator
were to order Madagascar either to conserve permanently, or to com-
ply with a foreign entity's plan over management of its natural
resources, the United Nations could find an infringement of Madagas-
car's sovereignty under Resolution 1803. Although a court may order
a sovereign entity to meet its voluntary, time-limited, "commercial
promises,"' 177 it may not direct foreign management of the sovereign
nation's territory and its natural resources indefinitely. 7 8 WWF's
reply would be that United Nations Resolution 1803 requires foreign
investment agreements "freely entered into by or between sovereign
States [to be] observed in good faith":
179
The result is that a State cannot invoke its sovereignty to disregard
commitments freely undertaken through the exercise of this same
sovereignty and cannot, through measures belonging to its internal
order, make null and void the rights of the contracting party which
has performed its various obligations under the contract.18
0
The problem with this argument is the same as that encountered in
other possible remedies: WWF would have difficulty proving that
United Nations Resolution 1803 includes debt-for-nature swap agree-
ments in its definition of "investment agreement." Debt-for-nature
swaps did not exist when the United Nations passed Resolution
1803.81 Moreover, some might argue that Madagascar did not
"freely" enter into the swap agreement, because WWF used the
nation's vulnerable foreign debt position to force Madagascar into
176. World Wildlife Fund & Matagasy Department of Water and Forests, Priority
Protected Areas Management Plan, Aug. 15, 1988, at '19, reprinted in WWF PROPOSAL TO
USAID, supra note 10, app. D.
177. Libya-Oil Cos. Arbitration, supra note 151, at 1. The concession agreements were to
have a duration of at least fifty years. Id. at 24.
178. The concept of "self-determination," reflected in United Nations Resolution on
Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, supra note 152, and The Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3201, 6 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 3,
U.N. Doc 9559 (1974), would not permit such interference in a state's decisions. See I.
BROWNLIE, supra note 113, at 540, 542.
179. United Nations Resolution 1803, supra note 152, at 16. However, United Nations
Resolutions are not normally considered binding law. Such resolutions are not a defense
unless they codify, or have themselves become, customary international law. 1. BROWNLIE,
supra note 113, at 14-15.
180. Libya-Oil Cos. Arbitration, supra note 151, at 24.
181. The United Nations passed Resolution 1803 in 1962, long before the first debt-for-
nature swap in Bolivia. See Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, supra note 172;
Comment, supra note 17, at 326.
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relinquishing some of its sovereignty. 182 Further, because Madagas-
car has no domestic NGO's, a court or the United Nations may
believe Madagascar's sovereignty is threatened when its territory is to
be administered by a foreign NGO, WWF, and a mere "titular head,"
the MPAEF. WWF may also argue the theory of abuse of govern-
mental power, under customary international law.' 83 An abuse of
governmental power would occur if Madagascar passed legislation
expropriating the Malagasy debt-for-nature swap agreement, or pro-
vided inadequate remedies in its own courts for such an expropria-
tion.184 Considering the economic pressures in Madagascar and the
historical instability of its government, 185 one can readily envision a
repeal of the law permitting the debt-for-nature swaps."8 6 If Mada-
gascar repealed the law or failed to provide adequate remedies for its
breach, a trier of fact, applying customary international law and
Libya Oil, could choose from two remedies: specific performance
(restitutio in integrum), and damages (restitutio in pristinium).187
Reparation must, as far as possible, remove all consequences of an
illegal act and reestablish the situation that would have existed. 8
Where the contract is a debt-for-nature transaction, however, only
damages would maintain Madagascar's sovereignty.'8 9 Otherwise the
debt-for-nature swap agreement, which places control of certain natu-
ral resources under either a foreign-funded local NGO or a foreign
NGO, would allow a foreign entity to direct the host country's devel-
182. Brazilian Foreign Minister Roberto Costa de Abreu stated, "Brazil ... will not see
itself turned into a nature preserve for the rest of humanity. Our most important goal is
economic development." The World Puts Heat on Brazil, World Press Rev., May 1989, at 38.
When French Prime Minister Michel Rocard made a debt-swap proposal to former Brazilian
President Jose Sarney, President Sarney answered, "I am not in a position to present any
proposal like this to the people of Brazil, who are jealous, like the French, of their
sovereignty." Brazil Being Bled, LATIN AM. REGIONAL REPS.: BRAZIL REP., Feb. 15, 1990,
at 5.
183. M. AKEHURST, supra note 155, at 93.
184. Id. at 96.
185. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 82, at 3.
186. Frequently, both parties will agree to amend concession agreements. See Libya-Oil
Cos. Arbitration, supra note 151, at 4. Economic factors usually motivate the host country to
renegotiate, and foreign concessionaires often are pressured into agreement because the
concessionaires already have begun their project. See, e.g., id. (citing new Libyan legislation
and regulations relating to petroleum forced concessionaires into a new agreement).
187. The arbitrator awarded specific performance in Libya-Oil Cos. Arbitration, although
damages have been the traditional award for unlawful expropriation. Id. at 35.
188. Libya-Oil Cos. Arbitration, supra note 157, at 32 (quoting Chorzow Factory, 1928
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47 (Sept. 13, 1928)).
189. Bowett, supra note 157, at 937-42. For information on the calculation of
compensation for lawful expropriation, see KRONFOL, supra note 152, at 95-118; O'Keefe, The
United Nations and Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 8 J. WORLD TRADE L.
239, 262-75 (1974).
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opment. Accordingly, the remedy of compensation is the only viable
recourse, and it provides no natural resource protection.
D. Arbitration
The agreement between Madagascar and WWF did not contain a
clause stating that the parties would submit to arbitration in case of
dispute. Such an arbitration clause would nevertheless not have
improved WWF's position, because the same ineffective remedies
would be available once an arbitrator applied either United States,
Malagasy, or international law. Compensation would have been the
only available remedy, unless the arbitrator, applying customary
international law, took the invasive and dubious step of analogizing
the debt-for-nature swap to a concession agreement, applying Libya
Oil, '9 and awarding specific performance. Regardless, a court would
have uncertain success at enforcing either remedy against the foreign
host state, Madagascar.
IV. LONG-TERM SOLUTIONS
Two long-term solutions currently exist, which nations have used
in other areas of international cooperation. Several successful treaty
models, described below, could be adapted to the debt-for-nature
swap in order to attain the swap's ultimate purpose, environmental
resource conservation and management. Further, the World Heritage
List, a mechanism for designating and protecting sites as part of the
"world's heritage,"' 9' is an existing convention that, with a little mod-
ification to the remedies, could be a model for debt-for-nature swaps.
The main goal of either model is to provide an effective remedy, such




Little can be accomplished in the absence of multilateral institu-
tions that will eventually carry out whatever remedial environmen-
tal actions the world community can agree upon. In short, we
need an international treaty.., to coordinate and enforce interna-
tional action on the environment. 92
190. See Libya-Oil Cos. Arbitration, supra note 151, at 1.
191. Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage,
done at Paris Nov. 23, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37.
192. Richardson, How to Fight Global Warming, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1990, at At9, col. 1.
The lead United States delegate to the Law of the Sea Conference from 1977 to 1980, Elliot
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There is a tremendous need of a remedy for host-country expro-
priation, more effective than compensation and more certain than a
possible award of specific performance. An effective remedy must
balance a host country's sovereignty against the debt-for-nature swap
investor's goal of natural resource conservation and management.19 a
Nations generally resolve competition between the right of sover-
eignty and the need for multinational safeguards by negotiating multi-
lateral treaties to guide the parties' behavior. 194 The environmental
domain requires the same treatment. 195 An effective treaty would
respect sovereignty, provide satisfactory relief to the swap parties for
their expropriated rights, and provide other inducements for nations
to abide by the swap agreements.
Treaties are essentially contracts between states to define accept-
able state behavior. 196  Treaties can either mandate specific state
action in the international arena or provide regulations that govern
independent agreements.' 97  Investment guarantee agreements fall
into the second category. In a treaty governing funnel swaps, even
though an investor, such as WWF in the Malagasy swap, is not a
party to the treaty, it can ask its government to invoke the treaty to
protect its interest, because the treaty would specifically govern such
swaps. Furthermore, a nation "may not invoke the provisions of its
internal law as justification of [its] failure to perform a treaty,"' 9 and
Richardson argues for a global Environmental Protection Agency with dispute resolution
mechanisms. Id.
193. N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1990, at B5, col. 5. (reflecting Brazil's hesitancy in receiving
foreign aid); Wash. Post, Oct. 20, 1989, at A4, col. I (discussing concerns of people
"indigenous" to the Amazon); BRAZILIAN NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FOREIGN DEBT,
REPORT OF THE BRAZILIAN NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FOREIGN DEBT 3 (1989).
Brazil and other Latin American countries that desperately need environmental projects have
opposed debt-for-nature swaps, however, because of the perceived threat they pose to
sovereignty. Brazil Being Bled, LATIN AM. REG. REPS.: BRAZIL REP., Feb. 15, 1990, at 5
(stating that Brazil was "being bled by the international financial community").
194. M. JANIS, supra note 128, at 9-13.
195. Mushkat, supra note 32, at 38. Dr. Mushkat argues for the adoption of a
comprehensive integrated regional strategy in Asia for environmental protection and the
rational use of natural resources. She also recognizes the need for global efforts at
environmental protection. Id.
196. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 113, at 630.
197. Some treaties, "dispositive of territory and rights to territory like conveyances in
private law," are like contracts and mandate specific state action. Id. However, a multilateral
treaty that sets rules like the Vienna Convention or forms an institution is lawmaking and may
govern subsequent individual agreements. Id.
198. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, signed at Vienna May 23, 1969, art. 27,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 339 (not in force for the United States) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
Even though the United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, the United States
Department of State recognizes it as an "authoritative guide to current treaty law and
practice." S. EXEC. Doc. No. L, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1971).
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it "cannot adduce as against another State [its] own Constitution with
a view to evading obligations incumbent upon [it] under international
law or treaties in force."' 99 Thus, a nation often must incorporate an
international agreement into its municipal law. 200 Even though the
treaty places limits on state behavior, it does not infringe upon sover-
eignty where a nation voluntarily accepts limitations on its
sovereignty.2 °'
In promoting long-term compliance, treaties provide several
advantages over domestic law or customary international law. First,
the reciprocal benefits and voluntary negotiation and acceptance of a
treaty's terms induce states to respect their treaty obligations.20 2 Sec-
ond, treaties offer stability, because they "are not normally terminated
upon a change in the government of one of the parties. '2°3 The third
and most important benefit of a treaty governing debt-for-nature swap
transactions would overcome the inappropriateness of domestic and
customary international law remedies. A treaty could include a dis-
pute resolution provision that mandates negotiation and conciliation
as a "remedy" for expropriation. Such a provision could operate
either prophylactically or as a post-expropriation remedy. If domestic
pressures required Madagascar to renegotiate the terms of the swap,
to avoid expropriation, it could call for negotiations with WWF under
rules established under the treaty. Likewise, if Madagascar unilater-
ally decided to expropriate, WWF could demand mandatory negotia-
tions with Madagascar.
The politics of negotiation and conciliation would be the first
avenue of reaching an acceptable result. If the parties were unsuc-
cessful, then the aggrieved party could request the appointment of an
independent panel to adjudicate the dispute. 2° 4  Even though the
panel's recommendations may not have a domestic court's force of
law, its recommendations, which could include retaliation against the
199. Treatment of Polish Nationals in Danzig (Pol. v. Danzig), 1931 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B),
no. 44, at 24 (Feb. 4, 1932).
200. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 113, at 38.
201. Voss, The Protection and Promotion of Foreign Direct Investment in Developing
Countries: Interests, Interdependencies, Intricacies, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 720 (1982).
202. M. JANIS, supra note 128, at 13, 16, 18. The Vienna Convention abides by the
principle of customary international law, pacta sunt servanda, which states, "Every treaty in
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." Vienna
Convention, supra note 198, art. 27, at 339.
203. M. JANIS, supra note 128, at 32.
204 Provisions do exist for a dispute settlement system that requires negotiation,
consultation, and the appointment of an independent panel. The General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") includes one such system that has been "reasonably successful in
resolving recent trade disputes." Davey, Dispute Settlement in GA TT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L.
LJ. 51, 52, 58-60 (1987).
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expropriator, would motivate an offending state to attempt to negoti-
ate a solution before reaching the panel state. Retaliation could
include, for example, the termination of foreign assistance to the
expropriator, and it would legitimize what would otherwise appear as
rich developed states using their economic superiority to meddle in
developing states' territories.
A debt-for-nature swap treaty could be either multilateral or
bilateral. There are advantages and disadvantages to both. Bilateral
treaties can be drafted quickly, because of the limited number of state
parties, and tailored to a particular developing country's needs. The
environmental promise of a bilateral treaty is limited, however, to the
two states that are its parties. On the other hand, a multilateral treaty
would provide a long-term global solution because it binds many
actors.2 °5 Yet multilateral treaties often take longer to negotiate and
execute, and are more general in their approach. Nevertheless, con-
sidering the motivation behind debt-for-nature swaps-responding to
worldwide environmental distress that ignores man-made national
boundaries-a multilateral treaty is clearly preferable. 2 6 A multilat-
eral treaty concerning debt-for-nature swaps would not only respect
sovereignty, but provide effective relief as well. Such a treaty would
stabilize the swaps' long term goal of preservation of the tropical
forests.
2. EXISTING MODELS FOR A TREATY SOLUTION
Several existing multilateral treaties and agreements can be used
as models for a debt-for-nature swap treaty. This Section discusses
four treaties, namely, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons,20 7 the International Seabed Authority of the United
205. Mushkat, supra note 32, at 38. "The challenges in the environmental domain cannot
be handled effectively by individual countries, and the advantage of a collective approach is
that it allows economies of scale and makes use of the institutional machinery that is already in
place." Id.
206. Competing needs for and inequitable access to water in Egypt, Jordan, Turkey,
Ethiopia, and Israel illustrate the effect of the lack of a treaty in the face of international
environmental problems. See Cowell, Water Rights. Plenty of Mud to Sling, N.Y. Times, Feb.
7, 1990, at A4, col. 1. Earlier this year, Egypt temporarily blocked a loan to Ethiopia, the
upstream source of the Blue Nile, from the African Development Bank. Id. Egypt believed
that the loan was earmarked for a project that would consume too much Nile water. Id.
There was also a dispute concerning the supply of water emanating from the Turkish
portion of the Euphrates. Id. Countries downstream disputed Turkey's diversion of the
Euphrates to fill a new reservoir, which reduced the amount of Euphrates water reaching
downstream Syria by approximately three quarters. Id. at col. 2. According to Syrian
officials, many farmers lost their winter crops, and supplies of hydroelectric power and
drinking water dwindled, forcing rationing. Id. at col. 3.
207. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1,
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Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 20 the Inter-American
System for Nature Conservation, 2° and the "World Park" model,210
that countries negotiating debt-for-nature swaps should consider.
Although each of these models limits sovereignty to some degree, they
also manage to respect the fundamental importance of sovereignty
and encourage compliance, and some offer potent remedies for expro-
priation. These models could be adapted to meet the needs of the
swaps' specific long-term goals.
a. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
("Non-Proliferation Treaty") 21I has been called "the cornerstone of
the global effort to contain the growth of the 'nuclear club.' "212 It
requires each of its 140 nation parties213 to conclude a safeguards
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency
("IAEA"),214 a United Nations agency. Pursuant to the safeguards
agreement, the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty agree to accept
IAEA safeguards on all nuclear material used in peaceful nuclear
activities. 2I" The purpose of the agreement is to verify that nuclear
material is not diverted from peaceful purposes to nuclear explosive
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force March 5, 1970)
[hereinafter Non-Proliferation Treaty].
208. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, w/Annexes and Index, opened for
signature Dec. 10, 1982, arts. 133-191, Annexes III, IV, U.N. Sales No. E.83.V.5 (1983)
[hereinafter Law of the Sea Convention].
209. Creation of an Inter-American System for Nature Conservation, O.A.S. OEA Doc. G/
CP/2036/89 (1989).
210. See GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL, THE FUTURE OF THE ANTARCTIC:
BACKGROUND FOR A UN DEBATE 1, 18 (1985).
211. Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 207, at 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839 at 4, 729 U.N.T.S.
at 161.
212. Koplow, Arms Control Inspection: Constitutional Restrictions on Treaty Verification in
the United States, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 229, 251 (1988).
213. EUROPA PUBLICATIONS LTD., supra note 11, at 60. Madagascar is a party to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty and a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Id. at 52;
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 142, at 357; Leventhal, The Nonproliferation Hoax, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 20, 1990, at AI5, col. 3.
214. Non-Proliferation Treaty, supa note 207, art. II, at 487, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, at 5-6, 729
U.N.T.S. at 172; see also EUROPA PUBLICATIONS LTD., supra note 11, at 59, 60; Koplow,
supra note 212, at 252. The IAEA is an autonomous intergovernmental organization that the
United Nations formed in 1957. EUROPA PUBLICATIONS LTD., supra note 11, at 59. It is a
member of the U.N. system and annually reports on its activities to the U.N. Id. Its principal
objectives are "to enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity
throughout the world and to ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its
request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military
purpose." Id.
215. Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 207, art. III, at 487-88, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, at 5-6,
729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
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devices.2 16 The IAEA safeguards require the parties to keep detailed
records and to allow IAEA personnel to conduct on-site inspec-
tions.2 17 Each party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty also agrees not
to seek, manufacture, or receive nuclear explosive devices.218 The
Treaty resolves sovereignty concerns by negotiating the necessary
safeguards and by having a neutral third party, the IAEA, conclude
negotiations.
219
Some critics have argued that the Non-Proliferation Treaty
enforcement and auditing provisions are not strong enough. 220 How-
ever, the Treaty was not designed as a "police force," 22' and so far
enforcement has not been much of a problem. States generally have
adhered to the Non-Proliferation Treaty because they voluntarily
agreed to do so, and sanctions include the suspension and return of
IAEA-provided nuclear material and equipment.222 The Non-
Proliferation Treaty is an important document because it represents
the outer limits of restrictions on sovereignty that most states would
be willing to accept.
b. The United Nations and the International Seabed Authority
The United Nations has attempted to resolve global development
problems by becoming a "clearinghouse" for the legal rules of indus-
trialized countries' development programs in the Third World.22 3
216. Id.; see also EUROPA PUBLICATIONS LTD., supra note 11, at 59; Koplow, supra note
212, at 252 n.122.
217. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, done Oct. 26, 1956, 8 U.S.T.
1093, T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 3; see also Koplow, supra note 212, at 252-53.
218. Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 207, art. II, at 487, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, at 5, 729
U.N.T.S. at 171.
219. Id. art. III, at 487-89, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, at 507, 727 U.N.T.S. at 172; see also Koplow,
supra note 212, at 252.
220. Koplow, supra note 212, at 253 n.122. While the Non-Proliferation Treaty's
limitations are well known, support for it is extremely widespread. Nevertheless, there are a
few detractors. Paul Leventhal, the President of the Nuclear Control Institute, argues that the
Non-Proliferation Treaty needs to be revised because member countries are taking actions that
proliferate nuclear weapons without violating the Treaty. Leventhal, supra note 213, at A15,
col. 3. He does not argue that the treaty lacks police power; he merely contends that the
treaty's provisions do not address contemporary state behavior. Id. at col. 6.
221. Koplow, supra note 212, at 252 n.122.
222. P. SZASZ, THE LAW AND PRACTICES OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY
AGENCY 333, 601-05, 632-33 (1970). The IAEA may suspend members that persistently
violate any provisions of the Statute of the IAEA or any agreement entered into pursuant to
the statute. Id. at 602. In certain circumstances, the IAEA may impose additional sanctions,
such as the return of materials and equipment that the IAEA provided to the state, or the
suspension of all assistance to the state. Id.
223. In this role as "clearing house" the United Nations has adopted the Set of
Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business
Practices, G.A. Res. 35/63, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 123, U.N. Doc. A/35/48
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"The most spectacular initiative . . . is the idea of supranational
authorities equipped with binding administrative powers,"224 such as
the International Seabed Authority that was provided for by the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.225 Under
the Conference's regimes, states are prohibited from exercising sover-
eignty over the seabed, ocean floor, and related subsoil beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction, and they may only extract from these
areas in accordance with the terms of the Conference. The Confer-
ence established an international authority to exploit the seabed com-
mercially and to distribute the economic benefits to parties. 226 Like
the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Conference provides for a neutral
third-party negotiator.227
Some commentators promote a modified view of the global
approach to treaties, suggesting multilateral treaties organized by eco-
nomic region. 228  They reject the United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea model as too "ethnocentric" because of its efforts to
form supranational authorities acting under United Nations aus-
pices.229 The critics argue that the Conference model assumes that
nations with divergent economic systems, whether developed or
developing, have the same purposes. 230  They claim that
"[i]nternational cooperation and adjustment of national rules and
administrative activities for exercising public control over economic
behavior with extraterritorial repercussions [should] not be conceived
of as worldwide or UN-wide."' 23 ' A treaty regime that has a large
number of parties may be inefficient and unproductive. In addition,
(1980). In addition, the United Nations has written The United Nations Proposed Text of the
Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, Doc. E/1988139/Add. 1.d (1988).
224. M. JANIS, supra note 128, at 157. The United States has refused to sign the Law of the
Sea Treaty and specifically refuses to establish an international seabed authority with any real
power. Id.
225. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 208; see also Fikentscher, Third World Trade
Partnership: Supranational Authority vs. National Extraterritorial Antitrust: A Plea for
"Harmonized" Regionalism, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1489 (1984) (as of August 25, 1986, only 31
nations, not including the United States, of the 60 required for the treaty to enter into force
had ratified the treaty).
226. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 208, arts. 140(2), 153, 157, 158(2), 160(2)(F)(i),
170.
227. Id. art. 287.
228. See generally Fikentscher, supra note 225 (arguing for "mini-treaty" approach).
229. Id. at 1490-92, 1507. The worldwide model may not be ideal because of ideological
clashes between the "three-group" system of the United Nations. Id. at 1490. This system
divides the member-states into the "B-Group" of western industrialized nations, the "D-
Group" of socialist countries, and the "Group of 77" of developing nations. Id. at 1507. Each
group has different interests in the sea, as well as different goals for a law of the sea. Id. at
1491.




the global approach often requires years of negotiation to yield
agreement.
An alternative is a treaty organization using the United Nations
"three group" classification system that groups nations in similar
development stages and with similar economic systems.2 32 Although
the three-group model represents an alternative to the global
approach, it is not ideal for debt-for-nature swaps, which require
cooperation between developed and developing nations. Therefore, a
treaty just for developing nations would not be as useful in facilitating
a long-term debt-for-nature swap effort between developed and devel-
oping states. Such a treaty regime would only structure the goals of
one of the swap investment's partners.
Other multilateral treaties are organized by geographic region.233
This model may function adequately despite the fact that, thus far,
the majority of the funds worldwide for the debt-for-nature swaps
have come from one source, NGO's in the United States.2 34 United
States NGO's invest swap funds in many geographic regions. When
NGO's in other nations become debt-for-nature swap investors,235
they will also probably choose potential host countries using political
and economic rather than geographic rationales. A regional effort
could emanate from the debtor countries themselves. A regional coa-
lition of countries could negotiate a treaty under which each country
would agree to place its debt-for-nature swap territory. This arrange-
ment would offer the added benefit of providing more regional and
less creditor-nation control over the land. For example, several coun-
232. Id.
233. Dr. Mushkat supports cooperation in stages in Asia. Mushkat, supra note 32, at 38.
First, regional organs would "harmonize" national laws, and then the regional organs would
codify these laws through treaties. Id.
234. Comment, supra note 17, at 326-35.
235. Japan has the necessary financial capability and ideological propensity to fund swaps.
"Worried about mounting hostility to Japan's huge investments in the United States, the
Japanese government has offered Japanese companies a large tax deduction if they give money
to hospitals, schools and philanthropic activities in the United States." N.Y. Times, Feb. 22,
1990, at Al, col. 1. Japan is discovering, and trying to emulate, the American tradition of
voluntarism that in part motivates our foreign aid activities. N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1990, at
A16, col. 6. The "reshuffling" of outstanding foreign aid loans to Latin America to fund debt-
for-nature swaps could "serve as a model for European and Japanese governments, which
carry another $38 billion in Latin American debt." N.Y. Times, January 22, 1991, at B5, col.
4. Furthermore, John Sewell, the President of the Overseas Development Council, remarked
that because the United States is likely to be surpassed by Japan as the largest provider of
development assistance, the United States "is no longer in a position where it can set the
agenda for development cooperation by the sheer size of its programs. Rather it must lead by
example and seek to influence how a large number of other donors allocate their resources."
Debt Swaps Called a Source of Financing for Third World Environmental Projects, Banking
Rep. (BNA), at 1390 (June 26, 1989).
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tries in Central America could, as a region, negotiate a treaty under
which they would perform debt-for-nature swaps. Such swaps might
be more stable and less vulnerable to criticism by those who fear cred-
itor-nation hegemony.236 Furthermore, the signatory states, neigh-
bors possibly deriving economic benefits from one another, would
pressure each other to adhere to the debt-for-nature swap treaty. This
pressure would not exist as strongly in a global multilateral treaty, in
which the parties have less in common. Nations may accept intrusive
roles from regional organizations that they might reject from the rest
of the world.237
c. The Inter-American System for Nature Conservation
The Organization of American States ("OAS") has suggested the
formation of an Inter-American System for Nature Conservation
("ISNC") 238 because of the ineffectiveness of the Western Hemisphere
Convention of 1942,239 and of various sub-regional multilateral con-
servation agreements. 2' The OAS is now suggesting the need for an
236. Brazil Being Bled, supra note 182, at 5.
237. The European Community's environmental program uses supranational requirements
that take precedence over domestic policy. For example, the Council of the Community
adopted a directive in 1980 that set "limit values" and "guide values" for sulphur dioxide and
suspended particulate matter that the member states could not exceed. S. JOHNSON & G.
CORCELLE, THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 112 (1989).
Certain provisions allowed exceptions, but even if a state fell into an exception it still had to
inform the Commission of detailed plans for the progressive improvement of the quality of the
environment in those zones. Id. The plans had to include concrete measures that the state
promised to follow in order to meet the limit values by April 1, 1983. Id.
The council has also established air quality standards for lead. Id. at 117. On December
3, 1982, the Council adopted a directive establishing a "limit value" for lead in the air. Id.
The aim of this limit value was specifically to help protect human beings against the effects of
lead in the environment. Id. The Council set the limit value at two microgrammes of lead per
cubic meters, with the understanding that member states may fix a more stringent value for
their own territories. Id. Member states have a period of five years after notification to the
Council in which to respect the set value of two microgrammes. Id. As with sulphur dioxide,
if the member state cannot meet the deadline it must formulate a detailed plan for the
progressive improvement of the quality of the air in its territory. Id.
As for species protection, the Council adopted a directive on the conservation of wild
birds on April 2, 1979. Id. at 238. Member states must take measures to maintain the
population of all species of birds living in the wild at a level that corresponds to ecological
requirements or to adapt the population to that level by maintaining or re-establishing the
necessary areas for habitation. Id. The directive set up different legal measures depending on
the threat to each species. Id.
238. See Creation of an Inter-American System for Nature Conservation, supra note 209.
239. Id. at vii. The purpose of the Western Hemisphere Convention is to "conserve the
wild flora, fauna and scenic areas of the Hemisphere." Id. at vi. To achieve this stated
objective, the member states of the OAS agree to adopt measures of mutual cooperation to
establish parks and protected areas, and to take all the necessary steps to administer and
preserve wildlife and nature. Id.
240. The study lists 98 bilateral treaties on international rivers, oceans, fauna, air, nuclear
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"intergovernmental mechanism ... [that] would apply the Conven-
tion's principles." 24 ' An ISNC would have the following objectives:
a. To help derive maximum advantage from sectoral interna-
tional efforts by identifying conservation problems, and to make
such conservation efforts compatible with those already underway
for socio-economic development, using the institutional structure
afforded by the OAS,
b. To provide opportunities for furthering understanding of the
advantages of an integrated conservation strategy,
c. To provide a forum for debate and discussion of conservation
as a vehicle for development,
d. To facilitate communication between OAS member States on
conservation issues, including the development of uniform termi-
nology and implementation of common approaches for the man-
agement and control of resources,
e. To sponsor and support pilot projects where conservation
could constitute a major part of development efforts,
f. To offer [advice] and technical support in cases where the
States involved in a dispute related to conservation choose media-
tion as the most effective procedure for settling their differences,
g. To organize the General Secretariat's participation in, and
response to, other regional and worldwide meetings and
projects.242
The ISNC proposal admirably addresses the need for a forum for
mediation in "conservation-related" disputes.2 43 The ISNC proposal
only suggests, however, that the ISNC act as a support system to
independent mediators; if "the nations involved in a controversy
choose mediation procedures, the ISNC could [assist] by facilitating
impartial technical experts or reliable witnesses. ' 244 Such a system is
inadequate to provide long term support for Latin America's environ-
matters, international rivers, regional seas, arms control, and natural resources management.
Id. at vii, 21-26. In addition, since the Western Hemisphere Convention, there have been two
other Inter-American meetings on the topic of conservation: the Inter-American Specialized
Conference on Problems Related to the Conservation of Renewable Natural Resources of the
Continent, convened in Mar Del Plata, Argentina in October 1965; and the Convention on
Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere, opened for signature
Oct., 1940, 161 U.N.T.S. 194, 3 Bevans 630, T.S. 981. Id. at vii n.I. There also have been
three regional "Declarations" between March 6 and May 30, 1989: The Declaration of San
Francisco de Quito, which concerned the need for coordination of conservation policies; The
Declaration of Brasilia, which sought to strengthen "cooperation in the area of conservation";
and The Amazon Declaration, which "endorsed future cooperation in the Amazon Region for
the development and protection of natural resources." Id. at vii n.2.
241. Id. at vii.
242. Id. at xii.
243. Id. at xv.
244. Id.
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mental problems. Ideally, the ISNC should require parties to submit
themselves to the specified dispute resolution mechanism that forces
them to negotiate a satisfactory solution to the conflict. 245  Because
the ISNC countries have significant economic and environmental
incentives to engage in debt-for-nature swaps, 24 6 it is in their self-
interest to create a swap framework that would secure a foreign
NGO's "investments" and effectuate dispute resolution mechanisms
in the event of expropriation. Similarly, any sovereignty concerns
could be preempted by predetermining NGO activities that would
constitute undue infringement. The ISNC framework could be
invoked automatically once a country agrees to coordinate a debt-for-
nature swap with a foreign NGO or a foreign government.
d. The "World Park" Model
A fourth possible model for a multilateral debt-for-nature swap
treaty is the "World Park" model. In 1989, Australian Prime Minis-
ter R.J.L. Hawke and French President Francois Mitterand decided
to withdraw their support for the Convention on the Regulation of
Antarctic Mineral Resources Activities247 and instead support an
environmental protection convention and the creation of a "World
Park" for the Antarctic. 248  The "World Park" solution could be
applied to debt-for-nature swap territory if it were modified to respect
territorial sovereignty. In its present form, the "World Park" model
would severely curtail a host country's sovereignty by prohibiting the
host country from acting in a manner that leaves the land in anything
but a pristine state.2 49 Critics of the "World Park" model argue that
its underlying theory, that all mankind has a legitimate economic
245. N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1990, at Al, col. 6. At the Barranquilla Conference on Drug-
Trafficking, President Bush and the leaders of three Andean nations, Peru, Bolivia, and
Columbia, "committed [them]selves to the first, common, cooperative drug control strategy
• . . the first anti-drug cartel." Id. A similar cooperative arrangement could address
environmental problems.
246. See generally Morna, Interview, Bernard Chidzero: Toward a Durable Debt Strategy,
AFR. REP., Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 46. Even though many developing countries cannot pay their
foreign debt, they can relieve some of their debt burden by making debt-for-nature swap
agreements.
247. Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, opened for
signature Nov. 25, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 859 [hereinafter Antarctic Mineral Convention]; Lamer,
The Great White Heap?, SIERRA, Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 27, 27-29. The Antarctic Mineral
Convention is a mineral development agreement originally negotiated in 1988 by the nations
then operating research bases in Antarctica. Sixteen of the twenty original sponsors had to
sign the accord before it could take effect. Id. at 27. The United States has signed the
agreement, but the Senate has not yet ratified it. Id. Because of French and Australian
opposition, the Convention's future is uncertain. Id.
248. Larner, supra note 247, at 27.
249. Vagts, The Evolving Antarctic Legal Regime, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 605, 609 (1989).
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interest in Antarctica's resources, is hard to substantiate. 25 ° Critics
also argue that Antarctica is entitled to territorial sovereignty because
it is a continent.2 1 The same argument applies to swap territory in a
sovereign nation. A treaty could, however, have territorial sover-
eignty as its base.252 If a nation voluntarily abrogated its sovereignty
to form a treaty,253 then the protected environmentally sensitive areas
in a host state could become a modified "world park" subject to pre-
scribed negotiations between the parties in case of dispute.
Similar arrangements currently exist. The Spitzbergen Archipel-
ago Treaty25 4 explicitly recognizes the sovereign rights of Norway, yet
gives nationals of all parties to the treaty rights to hunt and fish, sub-
ject to conservation measures decreed by Norway.25 5 The Spitzbergen
Treaty also has a dispute resolution mechanism 256 and mining regula-
tions that the host country cannot individually amend.257 Moreover,
the non-Norwegian parties to the treaty may propose modifications to
the Norwegian regulations if they are brought before a commission
composed of representatives of all the treaty parties. 25 The Spitzber-
gen Treaty is significant because it has been in force for more than
seventy years and is an existing supranational solution that respects
the host state's sovereignty.25 9
B. World Heritage List
The second model for long-term solution to debt-for-nature rem-
edies involves the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cul-
tural Organization ("UNESCO") Convention for the Protection of
250. Rich, A Minerals Regime for Antarctica, 31 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 709, 713 (1982).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 719-25.
253. Id. at 720-22.
254. Treaty Concerning the Archipelago of Spitzbergen, Feb. 9, 1920, 2 L.N.T.S. 8.
255. Rich, supra note 250, at 723 (discussing the Treaty Concerning the Archipelago of
Spitzbergen).
256. Id. Disputes concerning claims to land must be heard before a tribunal whose
president holds a deciding vote and is a member of the Danish judiciary. The Norwegian
government must then execute the tribunal's decisions. Id.
257. Id.
258. Treaty Concerning the Archipelago of Spitzbergen, supra note 254.
259. Id. Although there are occasional conflicts concerning the correct interpretation of
the Treaty, it has endured. Doughty, Pioneer Spirit Lives on Lonely Arctic Islands of
Spitzbergen, REUTER Lia. REP., May 31, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File;
Arctic Disputes Highlighted, PLATT'S OILGRAM NEWS, Mar. 10, 1983, at 4. Of course, the
factual situation that gave rise to this treaty differs from that of any of the debt-for-nature
swap territories, because the Archipelago was terra nullius before it became subject to the
Treaty. Goldie, Title and Use (and Usufruct)-An Ancient Distinction Too Often Ignored, 79
AM. J. INT'L L. 689, 705-08 (1985). However, a treaty based on the Treaty of Spitzbergen
could expand host-state sovereignty, but still recognize the swap investor's right to manage.
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World Cultural and National Heritage. 21 UNESCO recognizes spe-
cific sites as part of the world's heritage, 261' and places these sites on its
World Heritage List. A site on this list receives the assistance and
protection of the organization so that it is "preserved as part of the
world heritage of mankind as a whole. ' 26 2 Each site also is eligible for
grants or loans from the World Heritage Fund, and for the help of
experts and advisors.263 For example, the United Nations has made a
"designation" through an American NGO, the Getty Trust, and the
government of China to preserve the Mogao Grottoes, west of Bei-
jing.264 This coordinated effort is structured like the Malagasy funnel-
swap. The problem with applying this arrangement to the swap is
that the NGO and the United Nations may not be able to enforce the
Convention if a country breaches it.265 This difficulty, however, can
be substantially challenged if the nations add an effective dispute reso-
lution mechanism, such as a mandated negotiation process, to the
Convention. A treaty with guidelines for negotiation would
strengthen swaps in the long term by imposing international oversight
and pressuring host states to comply with debt-for-nature swap
agreements.
V. CONCLUSION
As the caretakers of the earth, we have an enormous responsibil-
ity to preserve worldwide resources for ourselves and future genera-
tions. Yet when NGO's swap debt for nature in an attempt to address
global environmental problems, they often risk losing their "invest-
ment," the momentum to protect the specific resource. Expropriation
is a risk for all types of foreign investment. The risk is more acute,
however, for debt-for-nature swaps, and in particular funnel swaps,
because the only remedy currently available is compensation, which is
260. Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage,
supra note 191.
261. Id. art. 11, at 43.
262. Id. at 40.
263. Id. art. 22, at 47.
264. Christian Sci. Monitor, Mar. 23, 1989, at 10, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni
File.
265. Anderson, Jewish Group Complains to UNESCO on Auschwitz Convent, UPI, Sept. 11,
1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. The World Jewish Congress filed a
complaint with UNESCO charging that a Carmelite convent on the grounds of the Auschwitz
death camp, a protected site on the World Heritage List, violates the 1972 Convention for the
Protection of the World Cultural and National Heritage. Id. Should a violation have been
found, the United Nation's options for enforcement of the Convention were not clear. Id. The
issue of enforcement became moot when public pressure encouraged the Vatican to reconsider
the site of the convent. Wash. Post, Dec. 8, 1990, at D 11. Public pressure was sufficiently
strong to prevail when domestic economic forces were not a factor.
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inconsistent with a swap's goals and leaves the taxpayer investment
unprotected. Thus, if we are to encourage other nations and NGO's
to invest in debt-for-nature swaps, we must address the need for effec-
266tive remedies now. Otherwise, without an effective legal duty to
continue the swap agreement, the principal motivation for the devel-
oping country's adherence to the swap agreements stems from its fear
of political and economic reprisal by creditor nations. This fear is an
insufficient deterrent in the face of developing nations' tremendous
domestic economic and political pressures. Some form of multilateral
or regional treaty that establishes codes of behavior and creates a dis-
pute settlement procedure requiring negotiation between the parties is
the optimal solution.
The process of negotiating a volitional treaty and receiving the
reciprocal benefits it provides enhances the parties' willingness to
adhere to its terms. As long as the treaty defines acceptable limits of
foreign investors' control over the development of management of a
country's natural resources, it will mollify a nation's concerns about
threats to territorial sovereignty. By mandating negotiation for any
acts of expropriation that affect the NGO's ability to manage and con-
serve the natural resources, such a treaty would strike a balance
between the NGO's need for adequate remedies and the nation's need
for sovereignty.
In the short term, debt-for-nature swaps have proven successful.
However, until swap participants treat them consistently with the
266. Interview with Alison Rosenberg, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs,
State Department & Larry Saiers, Deputy Assistant, Administration for Africa, USAID (Aug.
23, 1989), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (also available from Federal
Information Systems Corporation, Federal News Service). Mr. Saiers acknowledged the
benefits of debt-for-nature swaps and also recognized the ad hoc approach that the United
States government has used to initiate the swaps:
There is not an earmarked pot of money set aside for debt for nature swaps....
[I]t has been our own bilateral programs ... in some cases, it's environmental
groups such as the World Wildlife Fund that have instigated these. In some
cases, it's been the African government itself that has expressed an interest in a
debt for nature swap .... [T]here is no target that has been set up .... [A]s
opportunities arise we are trying to respond to them, as I think other donors are
interested in responding to them.
Id. Mr. Saiers then expressed once again that swaps are "a very important tool that is
now in our arsenal to help." Id. Finally, he conceded that in the long term, debt swaps will
probably not be that effective in reducing overall debt. He stated that government funds will
probably not be large and that the United States will only conduit the swaps with a "few
specialized countries." Id.
Mr. Saier's statements reveal a circular government policy. First, he claimed that swaps
are beneficial to both the environment and third world economies. However, he also admitted
that USAID is not promoting the swaps in a substantial, organized fashion and that the swap's
long-term utility is minimal. It is precisely this failure to pursue a cohesive swap policy that
renders swaps ineffective.
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assumption that swaps are long-term environmental investments, 267
neither the United States government nor the NGO's can confidently
make substantial financial commitments to such swaps. Swap inves-
tors, whether they invest for "equity" or for "nature," seek a return.
Debt-for-equity swaps offer a pecuniary return, while debt-for-nature
swaps offer an environmental return. Remedies for expropriation of
swap agreement rights must reflect this distinction in order to be
effective. The international investment community recognizes that
"security is necessary for investment. ' 26 The international commu-
nity also must recognize that security is necessary for environmental
investment. Without some form of protection such as a treaty requir-
ing negotiation and conciliation, debt-for-nature swaps will risk
becoming a short-lived, albeit creative solution to debt and environ-
mental problems. However, with such protection, swaps may help
relieve debt and environmental problems, and in the process
strengthen national sovereignty by improving the debtor countries'
fiscal health.
ROSANNE MODEL
267. Diana Page, an associate with the World Resources Institute, writes that the principal
objective of debt-for-nature swaps is to "provide funding for conservation and better uses of
natural resources." Page, supra note 34, at 286.
268. Clagett, supra note 38, at 97.
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